The Harvard Expedition to Samaria: 
A Story of Twists and Turns in the 
Opening Season of 1908

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Abstract: The previously unpublished field diaries of the principal leaders involved in the first season of the Harvard Expedition to Samaria are held by the University’s Semitic Museum. The narrative they contain sheds light on the organization and archaeological techniques applied at the site and gives some context to the much acclaimed final publication of the excavations (Reisner, Fisher & Lyon, 1924).

Introduction

In an address to the Australian Institute of Archaeology in the spring of 2015 I focussed on the 1910 season of the Harvard Excavations at Samaria, when the team recovered the important cache of Samaria Ostraca. But that discovery, like many others made by the Harvard expedition, might easily have remained obscured by time and the deep deposits of earth that smothered the grandeur of an erstwhile capital city. Events in world history could well have prevented the excavations at Samaria from even happening and, then, from reaching publication. During the broader course of the work, from conception to print (1905–1924), world empires lay in transition. Across Europe, political entities were defined or redefined and national identities gathered shape (for example, through observances such as Anzac Day). Maps of the eastern Mediterranean littoral and hinterlands, from the Great Sea to the Persian Gulf, would be redrawn to the satisfaction of great powers. The precipitating struggle proved costly in every way, and new endeavours such as the Semitic Museum at Harvard and its desired field project at Samaria required long-term financial sponsorship and stable dealings with scattered and multiple levels of foreign bureaucracy. Neither of these necessities came effortlessly, for the fledgling discipline of modern archaeology itself had barely taken flight. This paper provides a window into some of the many challenges faced by those who organized, administered, and launched the exploration of Samaria, an important undertaking that would ultimately help shape a new academic discipline.

Every excavation, like every picture, tells a story. In fact, excavations tell multiple stories, starting with those of cultures past. But the official report that ultimately emerges from a field project and, to an even greater degree, the private, unpublished notes and records left by an expedition also disclose a story about the expedition itself—a kind of autobiographical account of its own life and times. Moreover, field projects themselves sometimes unfold at such auspicious historical moments that one can analyse and understand the results of their work only within that larger context. While the primary archaeological goal of an expedition may aim at recovering a particular site’s ancient context and history, the chronology and broader setting of the project itself must become important factors in any subsequent interpretation. Such was the case at Samaria, since Harvard’s work there transpired during the waning years of the Ottoman Empire and the coming of World War I. The project’s inaugural season, in 1908, overlapped the very time of the Young Turk Revolution. All these events wielded a pervasive, enduring influence over world history at the outset of the twentieth century CE. And they ensconced the Samaria expedition betwixt and between international and local powers and events. The present study has this larger context in mind as it explores both the internal and external struggles of a start-up expedition cast within a bourgeoning academic field and the vicissitudes of world affairs.

Sources

Throughout this discussion, I base my comments and observations on primary versus secondary materials, particularly on unpublished records contained in the personal journals and diaries of David Gordon Lyon, Gottlieb Schumacher, Clarence Stanley Fisher (Figure 1), cited as LD I–III, SD I–II, FD I–II, respectively, and to a lesser extent, of George Andrew Reisner (Figure 1): Front row, right to left: Gottlieb Schumacher, David Gordon Lyon, Clarence Stanley Fisher with field staff in a trench at Samaria (courtesy of the Semitic Museum, Harvard University).
5), cited as RD I–VII. This approach allows me to step away from the beaten academic track trod and worn by the published record and into the otherwise hidden world of the protagonists’ private thoughts. Yet the use of such writings bears its own risk, since it could result in my guileless interpretation of their interpretation of reality. I shall return to this hermeneutical predicament in some concluding comments. Still, when handled judiciously, such unpublished, handwritten accounts can not only provide data crucial to understanding the archaeology of the site, but they can also enliven the story behind the discoveries and reveal the archaeological and administrative trials persistently faced by excavators past and present.

Schiff (1847–1920), a German-American banker, philanthropist and Jewish leader (Figure 2), became the financial founder and most generous benefactor of the Semitic Museum of Harvard University (Figure 3). Established in 1889 (very near the opening of the national archaeological museum in Istanbul), the fledgling Museum functioned under the vision and excellent care of Curator David Gordon Lyon (1852–1935) and represented an emerging commitment by the University to the study of ancient lands and peoples (Figures 4, 9 & 11). Construction of the Museum’s permanent home on Divinity Avenue

The Semitic Museum at Harvard University has produced a tremendous aid for students of Samaria by making available electronic copies of not only the two official excavation reports from the Harvard Expedition to Samaria in 1908–1910 but also these private, otherwise unpublished field diaries. These resources are accessible through the Harvard University Library Open Collections Program: Expeditions and Discoveries, Sponsored Exploration and Scientific Discovery in the Modern Age. Their online availability surely sets a standard for other holders of valuable research materials to follow.

I. Tripping at the Starting Gate

By the outset of the twentieth century, American interest in the archaeological exploration of Palestine led to three key developments. First, Jakob Heinrich (‘Jacob Henry’) Schiff (1847–1920), a German-American banker, philanthropist and Jewish leader (Figure 2), became the financial founder and most generous benefactor of the Semitic Museum of Harvard University (Figure 3). Established in 1889 (very near the opening of the national archaeological museum in Istanbul), the fledgling Museum functioned under the vision and excellent care of Curator David Gordon Lyon (1852–1935) and represented an emerging commitment by the University to the study of ancient lands and peoples (Figures 4, 9 & 11). Construction of the Museum’s permanent home on Divinity Avenue
concluded in 1902 at an approximate cost of $80,000 (the equivalent of around $2.2 million today).

Second, the American Schools of Oriental Research was established in 1900. Under the capable leadership of its first director, Charles C. Torrey (1863–1956), the new society acquired permanent quarters in Jerusalem, collected and maintained a credible library, and established positive working relations with other similar international institutions, such as the Palestine Exploration Fund and the École Biblique. Attention soon turned to fund raising with an eye to launching a field project somewhere in the region. After a generous pledge of funds at the founding of ASOR by the Rev. James Buchanan Nies (who bequeathed a large collection of cuneiform tablets and seals to Yale University) and Mrs. Jane Dows Nies coupled with a noble effort to secure other patrons and a license to excavate at Samaria—which Rev. Nies counted among ‘the sites of cities of the highest importance to science’—the plan stalled when the Ottoman authorities in Constantinople refused the request.

All seemed lost. But then the third important development occurred—one which not only revived the desire to excavate and focused once again on Samaria but also provided the necessary means to do so. Jacob Henry Schiff offered Harvard’s Semitic Museum $50,000 in January 1905 to support a five-year excavation at the ancient capital city. Although he initially pledged $10,000 per year, Schiff modified his terms in 1908 and deposited the full amount; at the same time, he also allowed for the expenditure of more than $10,000 in a single year. He soon supplemented the 1905 gift with an additional $5,000 toward anticipated expenses for the initial application to Ottoman authorities. By most inflation calculators, the total donation would equate to between $1.4–1.5 million today. Thus the idea that our archaeological forebears had hundreds if not thousands of readily available local workers but only a shoe-string budget, while project directors today almost certainly face the opposite situation, is patently untrue.

Harvard quickly formed a steering panel, the Committee on Exploration in the Orient, which in turn appointed George Andrew Reisner (1867–1942) as project director (Figure 5). Armed with this substantial financial backing and, this time, with letters of support from Charles William Eliot, President of Harvard from 1869 to 1909 (Figure 6), and indeed from Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, Reisner arrived in Constantinople in November 1905 and presented to the Ottoman Sultan a proposal to excavate at Samaria. Generally, such requests were granted only with approval from the Director of the Imperial Ottoman Museum in Constantinople. But despite the impressive patronage and further support from the American Minister to Turkey, the permit was not granted until the autumn of 1907. Schiff’s original offer had attached the stipulation that Harvard would secure an excavation license from the Turkish authorities within six months (i.e., by the summer of 1905). When the initial trip

Figure 5: George Andrew Reisner, Field Director of the Harvard Expedition to Samaria, 1909–1910 (from The Rotarian 49, no.1 [July 1936], p.23; photograph by Bob Davis of the New York Sun; June 26, 1933 [B8331]).

Figure 6: Charles William Eliot, Harvard University, President, 1869–1909 (1903 portrait Charles W. Eliot, Wikipedia, Public Domain).
to Istanbul ran beyond this time limit, Schiff graciously extended the deadline to October 1906. Ultimately, the organizers failed to meet even that target date. Because the unfortunate delay exceeded time limits imposed by Schiff, in 1906 Reisner accepted an invitation by the Egyptian government to undertake a three-year period of work in that country.

When the American proposal for Samaria finally gained approval, Schiff somewhat hesitantly renewed his offer, contingent on Reisner’s presence at Samaria to oversee the initial planning of the project. Harvard then engaged Haifa resident Gottlieb Samuel Schumacher (1857–1925), as field director (Figures 7 & 10) and former member of the Philadelphia Expedition to Nippur Clarence Stanley Fisher (1876–1941) as architect (Figure 8). Working on behalf of the German Society for the Study of Palestine, Schumacher had excavated at strategically located Megiddo from 1903–1905, where he applied relatively rudimentary field methods to open a wide (20–25 m), north-south trench across the impressive mound (see below). Reisner and Schumacher met at Samaria on Friday, April 24, 1908, and outlined the scope and methods of the project. That this strategy session even occurred implies that Reisner understood and approved Schumacher’s field tactics prior to the start of work. Schumacher’s own journals confirm their agreement on how to approach the site (SD I, 5).

Lyon himself arrived at Samaria around 6:00 pm on Thursday, May 21, 1908, and found there a comfortable dig house (originally built as a chapel by the Baptist Missionary Society in London), a full complement of staff (local commissioner, cook, ‘house boy,’ and ‘a soldier for our protection’), plus a well-laid table of ‘fruit (oranges and preserved fruits), fowl, and various kinds of meats, rice, vegetables, eggs, tea, etc.’ He did not have, however, ‘good and safe drinking water,’ and he wrote that ‘flies are a pest, and mosquitoes and sand flies still more so’ (LD I, 11–14). But as the inaugural season unfolded, such nuisances would pale in comparison to the problems to come. Although excavation had begun on the very day of Reisner’s meeting with Schumacher (April 24), only five and a half days later work was interrupted by rain as well as administrative and financial discord with local authorities. It finally resumed in Trial Trench A after Lyon’s arrival and ran from May 22–June 3, 1908, with sporadic interruptions, and then again from July 11–August 21, with a work force of 130 men and women (LD I, 15, 20, 24, 59, II, 5; III, 25; SD I, 142; FD I, 49).

Thus began a three-year period of exploration at this famous capital city. But why only three years, when the project’s impressive academic, political, and financial patronage had arranged for a five-year effort? The answer is very complicated and historians might point to a host of contributing factors. Recurring, if not persistent, problems included but were not limited to: objections to the pay scale; severe difficulties with the local administrators and work force; nasty disputes among the workers themselves; greedy looters and pilfered artifacts; the
improper handling or even loss of artifacts; disagreements over the disposition of artifacts; the insufferable working out of deeds and fees for land rights and the penalties for damaged olive trees; disputes over dumping areas; seasonal suspension of the project during harvest cycles; uncertain effects of local Druz revolts and, on the larger scene, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908; and myriad other challenges.

But the principal struggle, the grave reality that made the inaugural season nearly impassable, centred on personal tussles and disagreements between Schumacher and Lyon over how best to manage the fieldwork. As early as May 9, 1908 (prior to the on-site arrival of Lyon), Reisner had signed a power of attorney granting Schumacher the right 'to act on his behalf at the excavations' (LD I, 18). But as representative of the sponsoring institution and procurer of prodigious financial resources, Lyon clearly felt that he should have a major say in running the show. His private, unpublished diaries dramatically reveal how quickly threatening issues arose within and around the project. By mid-summer 1908, the viability of the entire effort lay under siege, and the way forward seemed quite unclear.

II. In the Beginning, Samaria Created Trouble

*America, Germany, and pre-World War I Currents at Samaria?* If the problems mentioned above did not adequately test an embryonic project in an emergent discipline, the fact that the on-site management brought into contact two men representing different scientific (if not political and cultural) approaches surely posed complications enough.

The relationship between David Gordon Lyon and Gottlieb Samuel Schumacher involved a strange alchemy of German-American connections and influences. Both men were born in the United States (Lyon in Benton, Alabama, and Schumacher roughly 750 miles away in Zanesville, Ohio) and both completed graduate work in Germany. From there, however, they embarked upon quite different courses. After relocating in Germany (where he married Tosca Woehler), training under Friedrich Delitzsch, and receiving the Ph.D degree in Syriac at the University of Leipzig in 1882, Lyon returned to Harvard Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where, despite the fact that his primary training lay in Assyriology, he accepted the Hollis Chair of Divinity—the oldest endowed chair of theology in the United States. (Ironically, the
appointment of an Assyriologist to this position preceded the arrival of Paul Haupt at Johns Hopkins by one year, thereby making Lyon the first professor of Assyriology in the United States. Lyon was instrumental in developing a program of research in old world archaeology at Harvard and in founding the Semitic Museum in 1889, where he served as Curator until his retirement in 1921, and even afterwards as Honorary Curator. In 1910, the final year of field work at Samaria, he accepted the venerated position of Hancock Professor of Hebrew and Other Oriental Languages at Harvard University (Figure 9). Lyon invested his entire professional life, then, in one American academic institution. His commitment to Harvard, to the study of ancient cultures, and through that study to enhancing the profile of archaeology at Harvard remained steadfast and above reproach.

Schumacher, on the other hand, left the United States when he was only twelve years old. His father, Jakob Frederick Schumacher, though born in Württemberg, Germany, had immigrated to Ohio prior to Gottlieb’s birth in 1857. Jakob Schumacher was a member of the Tempelgesellschaft (The Temple Society), a German-based movement that held strong eschatological and millennial beliefs anticipating a massive transformation of society. In 1869, he relocated his family to the German Colony in Haifa. Given his training in Germany as an architect and engineer, Jakob played an important role thereafter in the planning and development of that community. Following his own studies in engineering at Stuttgart, Germany (1876–1881), Gottlieb immediately returned to the German Colony and continued to reside there with his wife, Maria Lange Schumacher from Gnadenfeld, South Russia, throughout the expedition to Samaria.

During World War I, the Templer community relocated to Germany. Only in 1924 did Schumacher return to Haifa, where he died in 1925 and was buried beside his extended family in the Templer Friedhof (Figure 12).

In 1881, Schumacher had accepted an appointment by the Ottoman government as Chief Engineer in the Akko Province. He worked on the completion of the Dera’a–Jezeel Valley–Haifa railway, a westward branch of the Hejaz trunk route that ran from Damascus to Medina (Figure 13) and that was designed to facilitate the integration of distant Arabian territories into the Ottoman Empire. In the course of his surveys for the railway, Schumacher produced the first accurate maps of the region (especially in the Golan, Hauran, and Aijlun areas of Transjordan) and kept detailed records of archaeological remains and contemporary villages (Schmaher 1886). When Kaiser Wilhelm II and Empress Augusta Victoria paid an official visit to Palestine in 1898, Schumacher designed and supervised the construction of a new jetty in the port at Haifa by which the entourage could easily disembark from their ship’s tender. As his own passion for archaeology increased, the Kaiser subsequently sponsored an excavation of the geo-politically important site of Tell el-Mutesellim (Megiddo) from 1903–1905, and the skilled engineer, surveyor, and architect from the German Colony in Haifa, Gottlieb Schumacher, logically became the director of the expedition.
Adopting basic field practices that Heinrich Schliemann had followed in earlier excavations at Troy (1870–1879), Mycenae (1876), Orchomenos (1880), and Tiryns (1884–1885), Schumacher proceeded to cut a trench roughly 25 meters in width across the mound at Megiddo and to focus his efforts on architecture and artifacts rather than individual soil layers or stratigraphic sequences. He identified six major building levels, ranging from the Middle Bronze Age to the Iron Age, and brought to light the most impressive architectural discoveries to date in Palestine (e.g., the so-called Mittelburg and Nordburg edifices from the Middle Bronze Age, the Palast from the Iron Age, well-designed tombs possibly built for the royalty of Megiddo, and more). Moreover, he punctually published his work (Schumacher 1908), by which time he had also authored numerous archaeological studies in the journal *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*.

Thus, in retrospect, Schumacher was probably as prepared to take the reins at Samaria as anyone could have been in 1908. Given Reisner’s unavailability at the start of the project, Harvard’s selection of Schumacher as inaugural field director seems eminently reasonable. While both Reisner (1924) and Kenyon (Crowfoot et al. 1942; 1957) would implement much tighter stratigraphic controls at Samaria in the coming years, one cannot fairly evoke what they were about to do as a critique of what Schumacher actually did in 1908. Moreover, clarity of hindsight suggests that a lack of concern on Schumacher’s part for close debris-layer analysis did not constitute the primary catalyst behind the tension that quickly developed between him and Lyon. Other obstacles prevented the two men from negotiating a rapprochement: differences in their national loyalties, training, visions, and their dissimilar relationships to the sponsoring institution back in America, to name a few. The extent to which Lyon emphasized Schumacher’s dated digging and analytical skills in his private conversations with Reisner remains unclear in the journals. But these private documents do demonstrate that, strategy wise, Lyon repeatedly blamed his colleague for a ballooning cadre of paid labourers, an impractical scheduling and pace of excavation, an unmanageable expansion of uncoordinated fields of exposure, and the consequent inability to record (but not necessarily the failure to recognize) stratigraphic detail.

It is important to remember, then, that while Germany and America had played significant roles in the lives of both Lyon and Schumacher by the time they found themselves cast together at Samaria, the familial and cultural ties to Germany were much stronger for Schumacher. His affection for and commitment to the Templers in the German Colony at Haifa, where he had spent his formative and post-graduate years, assumed an especially powerful place in his life, and he would allow nothing, not even his position at Samaria, to impinge upon this relationship. At several points in his diaries, he himself openly wrote of such perceived threats (see below). That Lyon, conversely, never acknowledged the Templers or the German Colony when privately criticizing Schumacher not only for his field methods but also his desire to visit family in Haifa suggests, at best, a profound misunderstanding of, or at worst a total lack of appreciation for, the ties that were so meaningful in Schumacher’s life.

Beyond the level of personal sensitivities, the precise degree to which the growing schism between the United States on the one hand and Germany and the Ottoman Empire on the other had already tainted the on-site atmosphere at Samaria or the relations between Lyon and Schumacher remains open to question. But it seems reasonable to believe that such a state of affairs gradually spread across the region generally. Certainly, when the
Ottoman Empire, which exercised ultimate authority over the Samaria expedition, aligned itself with the Central Powers headed by Germany in 1914, the vulnerability of the entire Mediterranean world became immediately explicit, practical, and likely. The United States assiduously avoided direct involvement in the growing conflict until April 6, 1917, amidst the collapse of the Russian government in March 1917 and the eventual Bolshevik peace accord (The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) with the Central Powers in March 1918. But the daily operation and excavation goals of Lyon’s Semitic Museum had clearly felt the impact of the looming crisis already three years earlier, around the time of the Ottoman alliance with Germany. Lyon’s annual report to the President of Harvard on Museum activities for the 1913–1914 academic year contains the first direct mention of the predicament of war, alongside a now-recurring theme of lack of money for acquisitions and operation of the Museum. An atmosphere of gloom characterized his next three reports, and for the two successive academic years (1918–1919 and 1919–1920), Lyon did not even submit a report on behalf of the Museum. All these developments, of course, transpired in the wake of excavations at Samaria and thereby stalled their publication. But the gathering forces and cross currents ultimately proved so strong that one must wonder to what extent Lyon and Schumacher intuitively foresaw them during the preceding years of fieldwork.

In any event, both men had been exposed to and undoubtedly absorbed a similar mixture of American and German experiences by the outset of the first Samaria campaign. Still, they lacked the commonality and cohesion necessary to handle the whims of numerous local sheikhs and land owners and a complicated local bureaucracy that included an often on-site commissaire (commissioner), the local mūdir (Arabic; a manager or governor), and the mutesarrif of Nablus (an administrative term that replaced the older Ottoman gubernatorial title mutesellim). With the establishment of the Ottoman Vilayet system in 1864 (Figure 14) and with Samaria’s regional political centre now based in Beirut, all these officials functioned within this larger provincial unit under the authority of the Valī (cf. Arabic Wāli, head of the Wilayah) and many additional beys. While the latter may have headed a principality or held a government appointment, most had begun their careers as tribal chieftains or elders. Their administrative (or, more often, merely social) Turkish title (bev)—though placed after the first name—meant something like ‘governor,’ ‘lord,’ or even ‘mister.’

Trouble and Trouble over How to Handle Trouble. Already by May 30, 1908, as they faced a number of the problems listed above and also feared ‘a stoppage of work by official order,’ Lyon and Schumacher agreed that they should temporarily and voluntarily halt the excavation. But they seem to have disagreed on how to register their complaints with the mutesarrif. Lyon wrote that ‘As reason for suspension, [Schumacher] considers it wise to mention to the mutesarrif only the present impossibility to secure good workmen, so as not to open with him the more important considerations (1) So as not to offend him (2) Because he has not the power to give us relief’ (LD I, 45–49). Lyon complied but appears to have disagreed with this more conservative approach. To his letter of May 28 to President Eliot at Harvard, he added a note concerning this situation. From the outset of their working relationship, then, Lyon and Schumacher encountered personal differences in style and management. Whereas Lyon appears to have preferred immediate action, Schumacher advocated restricted and incremental negotiations. Such dissimilarities emerged as harbingers of more turbulent interactions relating to many areas of work.

In the opening weeks of the inaugural season, one primary troublemaker emerged: Hasan Bey el-Huseini, the local commissaire assigned to the excavation. Hasan Bey quickly proved a malcontent consumed with self-interest and lacking any real concern for the good of the project. Even in the early weeks of the field season, he (1) repeatedly levelled impossible demands on the project; (2) ‘used very strong and insulting language especially against me [Schumacher]’; (3) made attempts to blackmail the director; (4) requested an extraordinary salary and traveling expenses for himself; (5) tried to direct (sometimes through the local Ottoman official, the mutesarrif of Nablus) compensatory payments for land use and damaged or lost olive trees to the leaders in Nablus rather than to the local owners of the property; (6) orchestrated a 21-day work stoppage; (7) appointed ‘a notorious dealer in antiquities’ (Georgi el-Tawil, known locally as ‘Long George’) from Jerusalem who...
‘would spoil our workmen’ as overseer of the project; (8) insisted that the expedition store all artifacts in local facilities and that Schumacher ‘would have access only by special permission’; and even (9) attempted to dictate the precise locations of excavation dumps, etc. (These citations appear as an excursus between pages 512 and 513 in RD V [Reisner’s underscoring]; on the off-site storage of artifacts in the village, see also LD I, 35–39; compare SD I, 11–62). By May 28, only one week after arriving at Samaria, Lyon recorded that ‘Hasan now boasts of having us in his power, and that he will throw all obstacles in our way till he forces the closing of the works’ (LD I, 36–37).

Voyage to Constantinople. Ultimately, after consulting with one another on June 1, 1908, Lyon and Schumacher decided to leave Samaria and proceed to Constantinople, where they planned to give a detailed report of these and other shenanigans to a higher authority, Osman Hamdi Bey, Director of the Imperial Museum (Figure 15). The strained affairs on-site at Samaria had reached such a proportion that it seemed unsafe to leave Fisher there to make topographical maps during Lyon’s and Schumacher’s absence. Against the advice of Lyon, both Schumacher and Fisher initially thought that Fisher could remain on site (LD I, 53–54). In the end, however, and given that there was now much sickness (fever) in the village and Fisher himself was already showing signs of illness, Fisher ultimately left for Jerusalem (LD I, 62; FD I, 38).

Lyon and Schumacher left Samaria around 6:30am on Friday, June 5, 1908, and proceeded from Nablus to Haifa and then Beirut (LD I, 62, 64; for full travel details, see SD I, 49–54). The various meetings and consultations that transpired in Beirut belie the severity of the situation. Lyon immediately met with Frederick Bliss on Sunday, June 7, to inform him of affairs at Samaria. Bliss suggested going through the head of the Hussein family in Jerusalem to get the commissaire removed (LD I, 69). The following day, Lyon ‘called at the American consulate and explained the situation at Sebastie. It was agreed that we should call this afternoon with the dragoman Chouri on the Vali, lay the case before him and inform him that the decision is not feasible that we must pay for land in the presence of the Nablus government’ (LD I, 70). In addition, Lyon went to the German Consulate to obtain ‘a copy of law relating to antiques and excavations in Turkey. Saw it in German. To be copied for me’ (LD I, 71). Later that day, he received a printed copy of the law in French and wrote to Mr. Schiff informing him of the progress made in Beirut (LD I, 72).

The main issue of discussion in Beirut, therefore, centred on payment procedures and amounts. While at the American consulate, Counsel Raundal and dragoman Chouri explained in French that the current procedure . . . was obnoxious to the people of Sebastie, who feared that arrears of taxes might cause them to lose a considerable part of the pay. He replied that the arrears must be very small, and agreed that we may pay direct to owners at Sebastie, with the commissioner perhaps as witness, and that he would so instruct the mutesarraf by telegram. The government would use its own method of collecting arrears, but would not use us for that purpose. (LD I, 70–71)

As these negotiations unfolded, the complex relationship between the regional government in Beirut and the official Ottoman regime in Constantinople became apparent. On Thursday, June 11, 1908, while at the American consulate, Lyon learned from Counsul Raundal ‘that [the] son of the mudir of instruction at Beirut had been appointed by the governor here as commissaire at Sebastie, but that his appointment was cancelled by the governor when Hamdy Bey appointed Hasan Bey to that post’ (LD I, 72). Thus Lyon and Schumacher paid a visit to the müdir, who told them that his son would welcome the post. He suggested that they raise this possibility once again with the governor, but the governor was away and they could not arrange this meeting (LD I, 73) and so set sail for Constantinople. Passing through Cyprus, Rhodes, Samos, Smyrna, and Gallipoli, they arrived on Wednesday, June 17.

In Constantinople, the visitors would hold multiple meetings with Hamdi Bey, his son Edhem Bey, his brother Khalil Bey, who served as Assistant Director of the Imperial Museum and the one ‘who actually superintends cases regarding Commissionaires,’ and even the US Ambassador to Turkey, John George Alexander Leishman, from Pittsburgh (Figure 16). But beyond discussions around the immediate practical concerns of the excavation, it is essential to understand that here, in Constantinople, the die would be cast by Lyon (without Schumacher’s awareness) regarding the future administration of the entire project at Samaria.

Figure 16: John George Alexander Leishman, US Ambassador to Turkey, 1900–1909 (1900 Portrait; Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain).
Upon their arrival around 4:00pm, Lyon and Schumacher called twice at the American Embassy hoping to see Ambassador Leishman, but he was out. Lyon left the letter he and Schumacher had written to Hamdi Bey at the embassy for Leishman to read at his leisure, hopefully before their next meeting. But, alas, the Ambassador was gone again the next morning, so Lyon and Schumacher proceeded directly to Hamdi Bey. Again, however, neither Hamdi Bey nor Khalil Bey was there; Edhem Bey, Hamdi Bey’s son, said that his father would be back after 3:00 pm. He eventually arrived around 3:30pm, and when they finally gained an audience with him, both Lyon and Schumacher left the meeting feeling slightly rebuffed. Schumacher ‘had the feeling that Hamdi [Bey] wished to have little to do with the affair, he hurried over our complaints’ (SD I, 55). And Lyon recorded privately that ‘Hamdi seemed in a hurry, and but little interested in the story. He asked that the complaint be put into writing and delivered to him on Sat. June 20, between 9 & 10 A.M. The whole interview was hardly longer than 5 minutes’ (LD I, 76).

About 9:45am on June 19, Lyon finally saw Leishman, after having ‘met him in his carriage on the way to visit the Grand Vizier.’ Like Hamdi Bey before him, ‘He did not seem to take the matter seriously and said he thought that the commissioner had been bunglingly handled. I expressed that when I reached Sebastie matters were in such condition that I could show him no attention without reflecting on my colleagues’ (LD I, 76–77). Finally, on Saturday, June 20, at 8:45am, Lyon and Schumacher once again saw Leishman, who by now had read the letter and ‘thought it right, and had no suggestions to make. . . I told him that Hamdi Bey’s attitude on the 18th was not reassuring, that if we should meet with a rebuff today, our cause would seem to me in a very critical stage, and that before laying the case by cable before President Eliot I desired an opportunity to discuss the situation fully with him’ (LD I, 79). In this less-than-subtle manner, Lyon adroitly put the full weight of Harvard University behind his position.

In the end, though weary from multiple meetings and attempted meetings, both Lyon and Schumacher left Constantinople on Thursday, June 25, 1908, feeling that the trip had proven productive. Khalil Bey, after all, had declared that the local commissaire in Nablus

\[. . . \text{cannot dismiss any workman or overseer but with our consent, he has no orders to give to them. He is there to mediate all transactions between us [the excavators] and the government and is there especially to help us and further the excavations. .} . . \text{We left him quite contented and if he sticks to his word our journey to Istanbul will have been a full success.} \]

(SD I, 59; for Schumacher’s complete account of negotiations in Istanbul, see pp. 54–59)

Moreover, when the Samaria representatives had returned to the Imperial Museum around 9:30am on the 20th, Hamdi Bey suddenly acted in a very conciliatory manner. Lyon, who elsewhere presented the work at Samaria as ‘in the interest of Biblical science’ (LD I, 65; italics added), later recalled that

Hamdi Bey arrived about 10\(^{\text{th}}\). He was affable. Read our letter and said with emphasis words to this effect: ‘I promise you complete satisfaction. I have labored 26 years [i.e., from the beginning of the construction of the National Museum in Istanbul] in the interest of science, and no one shall cast a stone in your way, whoever he be.’ He then asked when we wish to begin work again, and when we propose to leave Constantinople, and told us to confer further about our affair with his brother Halil Bey on Monday afternoon, June 22.

The interview was scarcely 10 minutes long. (LD I, 80, emphasis added; cf. RD V, 72; SD I, 57)

Thus the beginning of a resolution finally came on June 20, 1908, when Hasan Bey was removed in principle as local liaison to the excavation. By Friday, July 10, authorities in Istanbul replaced him with a new commissaire, Mohammed Said Effendi ‘Abd el Hādi, a graduate of the Imperial University of Constantinople, who served as aid to the Wali of Beirut, and who also had worked on the excavations at Jericho (SD I, 58, 68, 72–73). After reporting the conversation to Ambassador Leishman at the embassy, Lyon and Schumacher prepared to leave Constantinople. But the divergent routes and nature of their homeward travel emerge as crucial elements in what happened next.

Despite the apparent success in Constantinople by Lyon and Schumacher, two huge concerns become apparent as a result of this trip. First, Lyon had real, heightened concern that the expedition may, in fact, come to an abrupt and untimely end at this point. Work had ceased on June 3, 1908, as Lyon and Schumacher prepared for their voyage to broker a settlement regarding the commissaire and payment for lands. Before departing, Lyon ordered Schumacher to pay Fisher 200 francs for a 1\(^{\text{st}}\)-class passage home should everything come to a premature end. He also told Fisher that he felt the oversight Committee at Harvard would pay him at least an additional $100 for his work thus far should everything end here (LD I, 59).

In addition, Lyon wrote that ‘[I packed] all my belongings, also the large camera . . . [and] large box No. 1, so that it could travel to America, if we do not return here to work’ (LD I, 62–63). In short, he truly entertained the possibility that he may not even be able to return to Samaria, let alone continue the work there. What a disappointment that would have been after all that Schiff had offered the Semitic Museum. Schumacher also sensed an uncertain future. At their first stop in Nablus after leaving Samaria, both he and Lyon offered Dr. Wright, local liaison for the rental of the house from the Baptist Mission Society in London, 2 napoleons per month ‘for as much longer as we shall occupy it, but . . . the length of time is uncertain’ (LD I, 65; italics added).
As they travelled together from Nablus to Haifa and Beirut, Lyon spoke with Schumacher about his salary should the project come to a premature close. Schumacher reportedly said they should at least take enough and proper levels for a map and also measurements for the architecture thus far exposed. He estimated that it would take two months’ work and said he ‘would make no demand beyond that for salary’ (LD I, 67). Lyon’s reporting of this conversation leads one to wonder whether Schumacher implied that, even with an unfavourable outcome in Beirut or Constantinople, he would expect or even demand at least two more months’ salary.

This exchange while traveling marks the first real sign of a break in the Lyon-Schumacher relationship. It reveals not only differences over details and strategy but also a disparity in overall attitude and commitment to the project. Throughout Lyon’s personal accounts, he seems entirely dedicated to the furtherance and the good of the project. For Schumacher, however, a faint hint emerges that his interest now focused more on obtaining a permanent salary. Following this exchange, conflict between the two men gradually but consistently escalated. The first crucial passage in Lyon’s journals detailing this emerging schism was written on Sunday, June 21, 1908. It seems so fundamental to the situation at hand and to the depth of Lyon’s feelings that it justifies citing the entire entry.

Constantinople. Sunday, June 21, 1908. On a drive with Dr. Schumacher to Robert College the question came up of the date of resuming work at Sebastie. He said we could not do so before the middle of July, as we had agreed before leaving Sebastie. I told him I had no recollection of such agreement. He said he did, and that it is recorded in his notes. The reason given for the delay was that the peasants have gone to the Hauran [a region east of the Sea of Galilee, stretching southward from Damascus through the Plain of Irbid and to the mountains of ‘Ajlun] to gather crops and that we cannot get workmen at an earlier date. Moreover, he wished two or three days with his family before returning to Sebastie.

At dinner I brought up the subject again, expressing my doubt whether absence in Hauran was the chief reason why we did not have more workmen in May and suggesting intimidation as a more probable reason. He felt sure I was wrong in this.

I reminded him that in the letter to Hamdi Bey signed by us both on the 19th and delivered to Hamdi on the 20th we expressed the hope to begin anew at the commencement of July (au commencement du Juillet prochain) (LD I, 81–83; Lyon’s strikethroughs). He replied that this language should not be taken literally.

He then said that time would be required to get our cook and overseers together. I replied that a telegram to Datodi would accomplish this before we return to Palestine.

He said his family needed him to help them in moving from Haifa up Mount Carmel, and that he must have at least four full days. I replied that as salaries were going on, perhaps the camp might be got together and some work undertaken before he joined us.

He said that a date earlier than the middle of July might be tried, but he did not believe we could get workmen. I replied that unless we were sure on this point I thought we ought to try, that some work, like completing the map [a goal that would have required Schumacher’s surveying skills], could go on even without the workmen. Furthermore that but little has yet been done, and that the time is passing so fast that prompt and energetic action is necessary. Otherwise the result of the year’s work might not prove to Mr. Schiff the wisdom of continuing the work next year. (LD I, 81–83; Lyon’s strikethroughs)

A number of contentious comments and retorts surface in this passage. The first simple but striking aspect for any reader lies in the fact that Lyon took pains to record in such detail the various aspects of their conversation. It seems clear that he anticipated the need to possess an accurate record of his interchanges with Schumacher . . . from his own point of view, of course. This record also demonstrates clearly that, given his relationship with the Semitic Museum and its patron back in Cambridge, Lyon had to think strategically on multiple levels. His concerns involved more than just the fieldwork at Samaria. While he may have included his reference to Schiff at the end of his comments simply as a means of leveraging his position, Lyon seems to have had in mind an understanding of the requirements for sustaining the interest and resources of an unusually munificent patron on the home front. And given Schiff’s substantial and critical support of the Semitic Museum—itself starting years before funding the excavation—Lyon must have felt that much more lay at stake than just the work at Samaria, a fact that Schumacher could hardly have seen in as much relief as did Lyon.

When the two travellers arrived at Halil Bey’s museum office around 3:40 pm on Monday, June 22, they saw the letter they had written to Hamdi Bey lying on his table, but Halil Bey said he had not had time to read it and asked them to recite the situation orally, which they did. ‘He said the com. was young, that this was his first appointment, and that another should be given us, perhaps the man who has been at Jericho with Sellin’ (LD I, 83). (An Austro-German team, led by E. Sellin and C. Watzinger, had launched a large-scale exploration of Jericho in 1907; the project ran through 1909. That the new commissaire had worked with Germans the previous year boded well for Schumacher.) Halil Bey then outlined other matters related to the commissaire (e.g., his salary should be ‘10 pounds Turkish a month . . . he was not entitled to provisions or tent or any other pay except traveling expenses to and from Jerusalem . . .’) (LD I, 83]). When Lyon touched
on the primary point of conversation in Beirut, namely, difficulties around the method of payment for land use, Halil Bey responded by saying ‘that was a local matter.’ Ultimately, he seemed affable and accommodating to the visitors. Near the conclusion of the meeting, he remarked that ‘… the office of commissaire is to further the work and to see that the laws are carried out. That he ought to live on good terms with the explorers. He promised definitely a change and said that matters would be arranged by telegram’ (LD I, 84).

The voyage to Constantinople, then, brought a tenuous success that should have prompted cautious optimism. But, in terms of the on-site progress of the project, a larger issue entered play at this point: the question of Schumacher’s status on the dig. Lyon seems to have seized upon a disagreement over when to restart the excavation as a motive (or perhaps pretext) for replacing Schumacher after the 1908 season. Their differing views on this subject surfaced in the June 22 meeting with Halil Bey.

**Lyon’s Administrative Detour and Schumacher’s Administrative Death Knell.** Just prior to their departure from Constantinople, a specific issue suddenly combusted into a major one for Lyon: ‘He [Halil Bey] asked when we wished to begin work. I replied, as soon as possible.’ Schumacher countered with: ‘on the 7th or 8th of July’ (LD I, 84). It was now June 22, and Lyon clearly saw the delay as inordinate. In a follow-up conversation with Schumacher, he said that they must tell Halil Bey that the new commissaire should arrive at Samaria by July 4—that he (Lyon) would be there by that day. But, ultimately, Schumacher seems to have gotten his way, and slightly more; not until Saturday, July 11, did the field work resume ‘for 3rd time, the last stop having been on June 3’ (LD II, 5). The extra delay may seem a small victory for Schumacher, but it would prove a very costly one, and one that may have sealed his overall fate with Lyon, Harvard, and the project at Samaria.

In a talk with Schumacher at the hotel, I told him it would be well to write to Halil Bey asking that the commissaire reach Sebastie by Saturday July 4; and saying I told him that I hope to be there by that date or on the next day. I go via Egypt to discuss Sebastie matters with Resiner. (LD I, 84–85; Lyon’s strikethrough; emphasis added)

Lyon’s route back to Samaria seems curious and spontaneous, especially since Halil Bey had confirmed that one of the crucial issues (payment for land use, etc.) was a ‘local’ matter and the high seat of the local government resided in Beirut, not Egypt. Had Lyon simply retraced the route that he and Schumacher had taken to Constantinople (as did Schumacher, in order to end up in Haifa with his wife), he could have conferred once again with the Vāli in Beirut. Instead, he now suddenly embarked on a longer itinerary via Smyrna, Mitylene, Athens, Alexandria, and the Gizeh Pyramids at Cairo (LD I, 86). The passage cited above is somewhat ambiguous as to whether Lyon’s comment about travel to Egypt constituted, at this point, a private note or part of his actual conversation with Schumacher. In any event, he would set the future course of the project in Cairo by convincing Reisner to take the reins in the second field season. Schumacher may not have known it yet, but his days at Samaria were numbered.

Lyon’s unplanned return to Palestine through Egypt marks a pivotal point in his relations with Schumacher and the future of the project overall. A number of entries in his diaries suggest that Lyon seized upon what he saw as Schumacher’s recalcitrant attitude toward resuming the work as the primary argument for replacing him after the 1908 season (cf. LD I, 84, 87; LD II, 2–3; 37–38; 42).

Lyon’s detour seems to have sounded Schumacher’s death knell as director of the Samaria expedition. Somewhat curiously, the crucial meeting in Cairo remains one for which Lyon, rather uncharacteristically, chose not to record the specifics of his talks with Reisner. Given his detailed account of relations with Schumacher (and others), Lyon’s one laconic note about the Cairo meeting is astounding: ‘Giza Pyramids, Cairo, Sunday, June 28, 1908. Discussion with Geo. A. Reisner of plans for the work at Sebastie’ (LD I, 86). But clearly Schumacher’s fate was discussed and determined here, in Egypt. Lyon’s final diary comment before leaving Constantinople provides a succinct description of his expectations and plan:

*Schumacher will telegraph his wife to have Datodi [the dragoman] inform the overseers that work is to begin on Monday July 6. The earliest possible date would be Friday, July 3, which would allow Schumacher one day and night at home. As he wants 4 days at home and also objects to Sunday travel, he will perhaps reach Sebastie on Monday, July 6. I hope to be there with Fisher on the 4th or 5th, going [now from Egypt] via Jerusalem. (LD I, 85)*

Lyon left Constantinople at 4:30pm on June 23 and sailed on the Khedivial S.S. Osmanyich. (Egypt had become a Khedivate, an autonomous but tributary state, in the early nineteenth century CE, when Muhammad Ali Pasha wrested control of the country from the Ottoman Empire and sought to change his title from Wāli, ‘governor,’ to Khedive, or ‘Viceroy.’) Just prior to departing, Lyon sent a series of telegrams and letters that included:

2. (2) a heads-up cable to Reisner in Egypt — ‘Reisner. Congdon, Cairo. Due Cairo Saturday. Khedivial. Lyon’;
3. (3) a ‘letter to Mr. Schiff telling of success of visit to Constantinople’;
4. (4) and a ‘brief letter also to Pres. Eliot, of similar tenor.’ (LD I, 85–86; italics added)
Although Lyon’s private, unpublished diaries do not outline the full exchange with Reisner in Egypt, they appear to affirm the view that the discussion centred on Lyon’s dissatisfaction with Schumacher and the need to replace him as soon as feasible. The June 28th meeting in Cairo resulted in a quick decision. When Lyon arrived in Jerusalem on July 2 to meet Fisher on the way back to Samaria, he composed a ‘Letter to President Eliot setting forth the conditions under which Geo. A. Reisner could take charge of the Sebastie work next year’ (FD I, 87).

Lyon had moved quickly. From this point on, he and Schumacher maintained, at best, a civil discord in their daily dealings.

Interestingly, this account of the decline of Schumacher derives principally from Lyon’s personal records of the situation. Neither Schumacher nor Fisher wrote much of the friction that was growing on-site. In reality, Fisher’s journals keep very close to the facts and hardly ever mention administrative or personal events, conflict, etc.—events that he surely sensed or even witnessed in the course of the season. His records remain more purely archaeological than either Lyon’s or Schumacher’s. Fisher either chose to maintain a high decorum or he simply was not engaged in or perhaps not included in the administrative end of the work. His reticence seems striking, particularly since he kept a detailed account of his meeting Lyon in Jerusalem and their travels back to Samaria (FD I, 45–47). He wrote that they encountered Schumacher, who by then was returning from Haifa, shortly before reaching Samaria and that the three reversed course and returned to Nablus for the night. At no point does Fisher give any indication that Lyon had shared with him any of his conversation in Egypt with Reisner or that he already knew that Reisner would soon replace Schumacher. Fisher’s silence does not necessarily indicate that Lyon’s account is inaccurate, biased, or tainted with personal emotion. It may suggest only that Lyon kept his cards concealed and did not confide in Fisher.

Lyon met Ismail Bey in the reception room of the American Colony around 9:45am on Saturday, July 4, 1908. He outlined the untenable situation at Samaria and recounted his recent trip to Constantinople, whereupon Ismail Bey offered an analysis of Hasan Bey’s rude behaviour. Lyon responded with quite harsh words for Hasan, and his account of this exchange appears as follows:

He [Ismail Bey] speaks English tolerably, but John Whiting was present to help as interpreter when necessary. Ismail had a scribe present to whom he dictated in Arabic the essence of what I said.

I reported at Ismail’s request the behavior of Hasan Bey at Sebastie, told of my trip to Constantinople, and of the promise of Hamdi Bey and Halil Bey that we shall not be annoyed in our work. I said I had no confidence in Hasan Bey and hoped that we were going to have a different man, but that I do not know yet what will be done.

He replied that Hasan Bey is a stupid and headstrong fellow, who might be controlled by kindness; said the place had been given him at the request of another uncle, a friend of Hamdi Bey; and that he would talk with Hasan Bey and try to send him to me to apologize. He said that Hasan illustrates the Arabic proverb of the dog’s tail, always crooked, though you might give it a hundred positions. That he had tried to educate Hasan, but that he had learned little, and had left school without deriving much profit there. – I told him that such a stupid, ignorant and headstrong fellow ought not to be placed in such a responsible position, and that without a complete change of behavior it would be impossible to work with him. (LD I, 88–90; emphasis added)

Once again, Lyon appears to begin with a level manner and reasonable speech. But, if given an opening, his discussion soon becomes more pejorative and inflexible. As in his dealings with Schumacher, Lyon seems quick to reach a point of intensifying the situation, drawing a final conclusion, and ruling out alternative courses of action. It seems clear that, at a certain juncture in Constantinople, Lyon grew headstrong on proceeding to Egypt and removing Schumacher from the directorship. Now, rather than weighing the profitability of using kindness—even as a pragmatic, self-serving strategy, as Ismail had suggested—Lyon demanded a unilateral and ‘complete change of behavior.’

Dinner Discussions . . . All in the Family. That same day, in the afternoon, Lyon met Mahmud Effendi, Hasan Bey’s cousin. Mahmud also offered an explanation for Hasan’s behavior but now added his own observation that he suffered from a mental illness: ‘. . . he will not obey uncles or brothers, is “cracked”, is not to blame [for his bellicose behaviour] because he is “not right in his mind”’ (LD I, 90). He then invited Lyon to meet him the following afternoon on the Mount of Olives, where he would introduce Lyon et al.
to Hasan’s brothers. Lyon accepted, although it meant further ‘postponing my return to Nablus which had been set for tomorrow.’ He then left fearing that Halil Bey had not yet ‘carried out his promise to give us a different commissaire’ but also realizing that ‘If Hasan remains as commissaire, it seems that entering into relations with the family may improve relations with him’ (LD I, 90–91).

At last, on Sunday, July 5, prior to leaving Jerusalem for Nablus, Lyon received the news he awaited:  

At 7 P.M. on invitation of Mahmud Effendi, cousin of Hasan Bey, our commissaire, I dined with Musa Bey, a brother of Hasan Bey, on Mt. of Olives. Ismail Bey also present, (uncle of Hasan Bey) whom I saw yesterday. Mahmud Effendi informed me that Hasan Bey had rec’d a letter telegraph from Constantinople saying that he is no longer commissaire for Sebastie. (LD I, 91; Lyon’s strike-through)

When, on the morning of Monday, July 6, Lyon left Jerusalem with Fisher en route to their camp at Samaria, he must have felt a sense of accomplishment. After some initial frustrations, he had received a positive reception and brokered constructive adjustments in Constantinople (with promises of a change in commissaire); after an unscheduled and no doubt costly detour to Egypt, he had convinced Reisner to sack and personally replace Schumacher; and back in Palestine he had established favorable contact with important relatives of Hasan Bey and, finally, received news of Hasan’s dismissal from the post. On his way back to Samaria via Nablus, the savvy Lyon drove rapidly and even altered his usual route so as to pass through ‘the village owned by Ismail Bey, . . . [who had] about 10,000 olive trees in [the] region’ (FD I, 45). Fisher noted that, upon reaching Ismail Bey’s estate, Lyon ‘bought some fine white grapes, which we ate sitting under the big tree just above the little inn or restaurant’ (FD I, 45–46). While in faraway places, then, Lyon had furtively succeeded in dealing major blows to his two perceived sources of greatest trouble at Samaria, Gottlieb Schumacher and Hasan Bey.

As a result of the protracted and very difficult period that consumed much of the inaugural season of fieldwork, Lyon devoted a huge segment of his initial journal to simpering frustrations with Schumacher and the struggle to remove Hasan Bey from office—a struggle that involved multiple cessations of work at the site, an unplanned trip to Istanbul by Schumacher and Lyon, and then another unplanned trip to Cairo alone. Following Hasan Bey’s dismissal as commissaire, Schumacher—somewhat ironically, perhaps, since he presumably did not yet know of his fate—cited other officials who referred to Hasan Bey as ‘a fool, a man without sense and not at all fit for the position he occupied’ (SD I, 68).

But Lyon’s troubles would not stop here. When he and Fisher, riding between Nablus and Samaria while en route home, met Schumacher returning from Haifa, they learned that he had already made a stop at the excavation. Schumacher reported that no commissaire was currently on-site. Hearing this news, the three returned to Nablus ‘for the night, in order to make inquiry.’ Alas, Schumacher was the herald of further bad news, for he described vandalism at the Augusteum (locals had thrown stones on the great staircase and had pulled a capital down from its place) and told Lyon that ‘the people of Nablus Sebastie have sent in a petition to have our work stopped.’ In addition, he said that ‘a serious form of fever has been prevailing there’ (LD I, 92; Lyon’s strike-through; SD I, 65, 68; FD I, 47). When the trio arrived back at Nablus, they could learn nothing about a new commissaire; the mutesarrif was away and they would have to invest yet another day awaiting his return.

Finally, on Tuesday, July 7, 1908, the three Samaria representatives gained an audience with the mutesarrif of Nablus, who addressed three topics of concern. First, he confirmed ‘that he knew of Hasan Bey’s dismissal, but was not informed as to his successor.’ Second, he had accepted and approved a request from Hamdi Bey that the expedition might construct a barracks somewhere at Samaria. Third, he affirmed that ‘the only object of governmental control in our payments would be to make sure that the pay goes to the real owners and thus save us from future troubles, that the Sebastie sheikhs cannot be relied on to do right.’ Lyon added an abbreviated journal note stating that the mutesarrif ‘wrote and sent to office a telegram addressed to Vali of Beirut regarding commissaire. When com. comes we hope that payment for lands may be adjusted in a fair way’ (LD I, 92–93). Later on, as Schumacher ordered material for building a kitchen of mats at the dig site, he met Abd-al-Hadi, an uncle of the newly assigned commissaire, and learned that he was now on his way to Samaria from his home in Beirut.

Home Again, Home Again. Not until 3pm did the three beleaguered travellers leave Nablus for Samaria, where they finally arrived at 4:30pm Thus despite Lyon’s best intentions, his own return to Samaria coincided with that of Schumacher, who in the end had the time he desired for his family in Haifa. But the future had been written in Egypt: Reisner would replace Schumacher. The first volume of Lyon’s diaries, then, ends with some relatively positive developments but also a lingering unknown—the identity and nature of the newly assigned commissaire. Once back home they selected for the new tents a location on the western side of the site (a place they then called ‘Camp Schiff’ [LD II, 2]). Lyon wrote a summary of Schumacher’s financial outlays (40,851.06 francs = $8,170.21), a tallying that likely anticipated an approach- ing end to his service there. In an addendum to this volume of private notes, Lyon also acknowledged that ‘we cannot begin work till the new commissaire arrives’ (LD I, ad- dendum to p. 93, appearing after p. 95). The Inaugural Season would not end officially until Friday, August 21, 1908 (LD III, 25), but already by early July enough challenges had occurred to fill several field seasons.
III. Deeper into Lyon’s Lair: The Sealing of Schumacher’s Decline and Fall

At this point in the discussion, it remains difficult to know just how to interpret some of Lyon’s journal entries, especially since their viewpoint receives no corroboration in the private writings of either Schumacher or Fisher. The strong action that appears to have arisen from a disagreement over when to resume work following the Constantinople trip seems, on first glance, like a tempest in a teacup. But apparently it was not so to Lyon, who also and always had to bear in mind the pressure of overall budget constraints and the need to retain and satisfy the project’s one and only patron. One must allow for the possibility that Lyon used the topic of restarting work somewhat capriciously and tendentiously, i.e., as an artifice to wield control over the project and to impose his personal goals on the project director. Whatever the case, following the team’s return to work after the time in Constantinople and Egypt, the seeds of discontent would sprout into a very thorny problem.

Everyday Hang-Ups. In the days immediately following the return of Lyon, Fisher, and Schumacher to Samaria, and in the weeks to follow, a number of circumstances arose that continued to hamper the smooth operation of the project and to raise further suspicions in Lyon’s mind. It is important to remember that all these day-to-day issues lay behind and undoubtedly exacerbated Lyon’s frustration with the nominal success of his overall mission and also, to some degree, with Schumacher himself. Perusal of several of these ancillary matters will help set the stage for a return to the ever deteriorating relationship between Lyon and Schumacher.

a. Stolen Pegs and Cast-Away Stones. Upon their return to Samaria on Wednesday, July 8, 1908, Lyon and Schumacher immediately encountered signs of vandalism on the excavation site. While measuring ‘2 small tracts of land on summit and S.W. of it, with view to purchase for dumping place,’ Schumacher discovered that ‘the surveying pegs and stones fixed by him on many spots have been taken away, which destroys the means of further map-making without re-surveying. This seems to be the work of ill will’ (LD II, 1–2; Lyon’s strikethrough). Both Lyon and Schumacher naturally saw in this activity an attempt to reverse whatever progress the excavators had made prior to the hiatus in Constantinople and to thwart further advancements. Such episodes had to worsen the erosion of trust between the project leaders and the locals they employed.

b. Wright and Wrong News. By Sunday, July 11, Lyon wrote that ‘Fisher has fever all day’ (LD II, 7). When Fisher’s status worsened through the night and the following day, Dr. Wright was called in from Nablus on July 13. The physician brought with him the needed treatment for Fisher but also some more ominous news. He reported to Lyon ‘that [the] mutesariff of Nablus is going to send a commission to Sebastie, [sic] with [the] ostensible object 1. To determine boundaries of land taken by us 2. To determine whether proper owners have had the money paid by us. Reported also that the tax collector now here proposes to be present on our pay day to seize taxes as we pay wages to our workers’ (LD II, 7–8; Lyon’s strikethrough). Regarding the procedures for payment, then, the situation seemed not to have improved.

c. Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss. The hint of further governmental meddling in the excavation’s payment schedule and procedures immediately raised red flags for Lyon. The new commissaire had just arrived at Samaria on the morning of Friday, July 10. He quickly informed Lyon that ‘we may pay the people here direct, if we can agree with them as to terms.’ In the event of disagreements or disputes, a commission would be formed ‘to fix the price of trees and land.’ Lyon’s reading of these comments appeared in a private, bracketed note later that day: ‘[Query: Is this a trick of the officials, in order to put a finger in the pie?]’ (LD II, 4).

As the weeks passed, Lyon’s initial suspicion concerning the new commissaire, Mohammed Effendi, seemed substantiated. While the new commissaire initially engaged the Samaria archaeologists in a positive manner, ambiguities remained over the recipients of the payments. Then, the day following Mohammed Effendi’s own arrival, his brother—who was conveniently a ‘collector of taxes’—appeared on site and demanded two years’ worth of back taxes owed on the house the excavation had rented from the Baptist Mission Society in London (see SD I, 74, 76, 80, 82, 87). By the end of the 1908 Season, Mohammed Effendi himself had become dissatisfied with his own salary (SD II, 147–48), and Schumacher all but accused him of openly pilfering several valuable objects from the excavation’s stored artifacts. Effendi simply attempted to turn the accusation on Lyon himself.

[Monday, August 24, 1908] The commissaire left today at 1030 for Nablus. Before leaving he took out of the nailed boxes several small objects, such as coins etc. and put them in his hand bag, pretending to send them separately and for post to Hamdi Bey. I told him that I did not consider this handling of antiquities quite correct, but he replied that he had the right to do so.

He afterwards had an encounter with Prof. Lyon indeavoring [sic] to prove that he as commissaire helped us very much during this campaign and was not duly remunerated for it, he also objects to Prof. Lyon taking any fragments of pottery with him. Prof. Lyon answered that he never intended to unless Hamdi Bey gave him leave to do so.

At last the Commissaire recommended that we should pay the soldier a gratification for services rendered. (SD II, 149–50)

d. No News is Good News and Revolution is in the Air. By the end of the day on Monday, July 27, Lyon may have felt that he had received at least one bit of encouraging
Problems such as those outlined above came quickly, when on July 24, 1908, Sultan Abdul Hamid II capitulated, a move that ushered in the so-called ‘Second Constitutional Era.’ How these developments would affect the project at Samaria was anyone’s guess, and of great concern to both Lyon (who, incidentally, consistently used the imperial, Greco-Roman, non-Turkish name, Constantinople) and Schumacher (who preferred the centuries-old and soon-to-be-standardized Turkish designation, Istanbul).

A much more serious development unfolded during this same period, and Schumacher served as herald of the news. ‘About 4 o’clock that afternoon, Dr. Schumacher returned from Haifa, whither he went on the 25th. He brings report of a revolution at Constantinople’ (LD II, 51; Lyon’s underscoring). In 1876, Sultan Abdul Hamid II had established the first constitutional monarchy in Constantinople, only to have it suspended two years later. In July 1908, the Young Turks Revolution pushed for a restoration of the 1876 constitution and a multi-party system under the authority of the Ottoman parliament. Success of their basic goal came quickly, when on July 24, 1908, Sultan Abdul Hamid II capitulated, a move that ushered in the so-called ‘Second Constitutional Era.’ How these developments would affect the project at Samaria was anyone’s guess, and of great concern to both Lyon (who, incidentally, consistently used the imperial, Greco-Roman, non-Turkish name, Constantinople) and Schumacher (who preferred the centuries-old and soon-to-be-standardized Turkish designation, Istanbul).

e. Money Problems Beset the Best-funded Project Ever. By July 30, 1908, Lyon forwarded the final salary owed to Hasan Bey Husseini, the original commissaire, to Consul Wallace in Jerusalem (LD II, 54, 57). Then on Saturday, August 1, he observed that the behaviour of the replacement, the newly appointed commissaire Mohamed Effendi, seemed odd. ‘He came neither to breakfast nor to lunch,’ Lyon wrote. After speaking directly with him, Schumacher learned ‘that his brother was forcing him to demand more money, that his brother took offense because no special attention was paid to him last night when he came to camp, and that Sheikh Abd er-Rahman (Figure 17) had been complaining to him that our foremen [who, in the following season under Reisner, will all be Egyptian] are not sufficiently polite and tender with the workers at the excavation.’ Lyon continued, ‘Dr. S. told him that we are going straight in every particular, and that his duty is to stand by us.’ The response seemed to ameliorate the situation for the present, but this particular sheikh, Abd er-Rahman (‘Servant of the Most Merciful’), would become Reisner’s primary provocateur throughout the 1909–1910 seasons.

The commissaire’s demand for more money gets to the heart of a serious issue with which Lyon had to contend. By August 1 of the inaugural season, Lyon’s concern over the solvency of the project was heightened. When looking over the accounts with Schumacher that evening, Lyon found that Schumacher still had approximately $500 in hand, that they expected roughly $800 more to arrive from Reisner, and that the Harvard Treasurer back in Cambridge held an additional $2,000. The combined real and anticipated resources added up to $3,300, but that amount would present a shortfall, especially since Lyon recognized that ‘Something will have to be set aside for expenses subsequent to actual digging. Unless therefore Mr. Schiff puts in more money this year, it seems that we can dig but 2 or 3 weeks longer’ (LD II, 62).

On Wednesday, August 5, Lyon sent a cable to the Deutsche Palaestina Bank in Haifa requesting a transfer of funds to the expedition’s account; he also cabled the Treasurer of Harvard College asking that he send £100 to the DPB (LD II, 66). Ironically, perhaps, these concerns and requests came on the very day when the excavation’s labour force had reached its highest number ever (441; see below). Then, on Monday, August 17, 1908, Lyon wrote: ‘We expect to close work and leave on Friday or Saturday following (28, or 29), our money limit being nearly reached’ (LD III, 16). The expedition that began with today’s equivalent of $1.5 million suddenly found itself pinching pennies.

Even in the midst of these worries, Lyon dutifully ‘Beged writing an acc. of the work at Sebastie, to send to Cambridge for publication’ (LD II, 62). He completed the report the following day and read it to Schumacher and Fisher before sending it on August 5, accompanied by a letter, to President Eliot at Harvard. The account of this season’s archaeological work, he wrote, was ‘intended for the October issue of the Harvard Theological Review’ (LD II, 67).

Luncheons and Schisms: The Big Issue and a Big Announcement. Problems such as those outlined above continued to nag at Lyon and consume his time and energy. But they were small matters when compared to his main concern—the attitude, work habits, and overall status of Gottlieb Schumacher.
Following his return to Samaria on July 7 from Constantinople and Egypt, Lyon did not wait long to inform Schumacher of the decision he had reached with Reisner in Egypt.

*After luncheon [on July 9, 1908] I told Dr. Schumacher of the possibility of Dr. Reisner’s resignation in Egypt, and of the desirability of having him to carry on the Sebastie work, if we have a campaign next year. He thought our desire natural and seemed concerned on only one point, that he should not seem to have been dismissed [this reply, if accurate, reveals Schumacher’s own awareness of the breach and his anticipation of the results]. I told him that this could easily be set right by interchange of letters on the subject. He suggested that he might come perhaps twice a year and finish the surveying of the place. I told him I thought this might be arranged, but was not sure, and said it might depend on Dr. Reisner’s feeling on the subject.*

I assured him that if this matter leads to his resignation I hoped it would be under circumstances entirely honorable to both sides. Our interview was altogether amicable. (LD II, 2–3)

What seems surprising in Lyon’s account of their conversation is Schumacher’s easy acceptance of the results. But whatever amicability existed between Lyon and Schumacher at the time would not last very long. Growing differences over excavation goals and strategy inevitably estranged the two administrators. On Thursday, July 16, 1908, Lyon complained that ‘By Dr. Schumacher’s order Justif and a small gang dug today near gateway in west, looking for spring said to be there’ (LD II, 15). One senses at this point that Lyon strongly disapproved of this effort.

Moreover, Lyon had learned late in the evening of July 9 that the new *commissaire* had reached Nablus en route to Samaria. His arrival had further complicated the atmosphere in camp. (As shown above, this new relationship would deteriorate over the second half of the initial excavation season.) Misunderstandings began to spread, first with regard to payment procedures, which had long constituted one of Lyon’s ongoing frustrations. On Friday, July 16, 1908,

*Commissaire returned early from Nablus. Reports that mutesarrif says that we must pay for land at Nablus in accordance with agreement of May 14*, of which commissaire brought a copy.

*We told him that this agreement was set aside by Wali on June 8, and showed him Raundal’s letter in Eng. and in Turkish to Wali reciting terms of agreement of June 8 and asking Wali to instruct mutesarrif accordingly. Com. took a copy of the letter. Will go to Nablus again and thinks he can arrange the matter, but wishes 10 Napoleons [a French-minted gold coin] to do so. Sch. tells me that he promised this and that he sent word to mut. by com. that he will pay the people for land on Monday next at Sebastiye.* (LD II, 16)

Judging from this entry, one must wonder whether Schumacher was now acting independently of Lyon, exercising too much autonomy, and failing to communicate all that he did. At least, it seems that this was Lyon’s interpretation of the situation. In a long, concluding passage for Friday, July 24, 1908, Lyon recorded his three principal objections to Schumacher’s directorship: Schumacher’s engagement of far too many workers; his regular absence from work areas in the field; and the number and length of his home visitations, particularly now as the season was drawing to a close.

*In the evening I told Dr. Schumacher that in my judgment there are now too many workers for adequate supervision, and that it would be wise to concentrate the work lest our available money be exhausted before any one piece be completed. He wishes to continue at all points (temple at threshing floor; summit of hill, and trench F’ to virgin soil or rock) and thinks that those can be completed. He proposes to continue present course 2 weeks longer.*

*I think Schumacher’s presence at the works needed more than is the case, and several days ago I proposed to him that Fisher and I would keep the record of the finds so as to set him free from that. He replied that this was a very important matter and that he must do it himself.*

*Tomorrow morning Schumacher goes to Haifa, to see his family, get money and supplies for the work, and to return on Tuesday. As to the frequency of his going home there has been no definite understanding. He wrote me in the winter that he would need to go home occasionally to look after his family (letter of date 1908), and that from Mutesellim he was accustomed to go home every Saturday. To this point I made no reply (letter of date 1908), assuming that at so great a distance as Sebastie is from Haifa occasional would not mean oftener than once in several weeks. When several days ago he mentioned his intention to go home tomorrow, I asked if in view of the probability of closing the work at the end of August he could not so arrange as to make a visit home between tomorrow and that date unnecessary. He replied that the interval was long and that he would need to go again to get money to pay expenses.* (LD II, 37–38; Lyon’s underscoring and strikethroughs)

Apparently, no rapprochement was reached. Early the next day (Saturday, July 25), Schumacher left for Haifa and the *commissaire* left for Nablus (perhaps feeling free to do so since the project director himself departed).
Lyons remained onsite and continued the excavation of numerous areas (Trenches A, E, F, G, H, and L) with the 377 costly labourers that Schumacher left behind. And the trials never seemed to end for Lyon. By that evening, he was beset with yet another problem:

Datodi reports that fresh complications are in the air. The Sebastie sheikhs are said to be in conference with the Nablus authorities, complaining that our work is ruining their land. The action of the sheikhs believed to be based on fear of losing their chance to lend money to the poor villagers at exorbitant rates (18 to 24%).

(LD II, 41)

Throughout this period, Schumacher had accepted larger and larger numbers of local workers, a fact that troubled Lyon on two levels. First, the excavation had to pay the labourers. Second, as hinted above, neither he nor Schumacher nor Fisher could individually (or even as a triumvirate) manage such a large force and simultaneously maintain accurate record keeping. Escalation in the tension between Lyon and Schumacher paralleled thepoor villagers at exorbitant rates (18 to 24%).

(LD II, 41)

ing force of July 24, despite Lyon’s repeated protestations. Beside the general number of employees, Fisher seems also to have sensed some hesitation regarding the efficacy of their distribution across the site. ‘It has been arranged by Dr. Schumacher that we divide the work betw[een] looking after the summit excavations and the one near the threshing floor. Therefore I can make very few notes upon the summit blgds.’ (FD I, 59–60). But this is the extent of Fisher’s comments. Unlike Lyon, he expressed no further evaluation or opinion, though he undoubtedly had been cognizant of the brewing friction between his two associates (which otherwise must have simply boiled beneath the surface, with the lid kept on).

The number of workers remained inordinately high through August 14 (364 labourers), when it dropped suddenly and without explanation on August 15 (221). On the 15th, Lyon opened his daily journal entries with: ‘No. reduced more than half. I have never approved of the large No. Too many for careful observation and record.’ He continued, ‘The work was in general the same as heretofore’ (he then listed a dozen areas where the fieldwork proceeded; see LD III, 11)—a statement that, in his mind, apparently served as proof of his position regarding the required sum of workers. Reduction in the overall force would not undercut the excavation’s productivity; it would, however, greatly improve management-labourer relations and the accuracy of recording. So he was acutely aware that an over-abundance of people compromised the integrity of the work on various levels.

Absence Makes the Conversation Wander. On Sunday, July 26, 1908, with Schumacher away from Samaria, Lyon conferred with a foreman regarding the current versus proper work strategy at this point in the field season:

Talk with Datodi about amount possible to accomplish in digging by the end of August, and about concentrating workers for ease of supervisors. He agrees that with the present method it will not be possible to complete any one piece of the work. In answer to my inquiry he said that he had never before at Taanach, Mutesellim or Megiddo, engaged more than 250 workers at one time, whereas we now have here nearly 400.

(LD II, 42)

Subsequently, in his entry for Monday, July 27, Lyon does not even acknowledge Schumacher’s return to the site. The highlight of the day was the discovery of a marble statue of an emperor, probably Augustus. But the frustration of the day (at least for Lyon) had to be the opening of new work in 2 areas: ‘New work. Began cutting a new slice on S.W. corner of the more westerly [?–illegible word] in front of the stairway. Began also cutting from above a new slice on eastern side of Trench L’ (LD II, 43; Lyon’s underscoring and strikethrough)—a trench in which the previous day Lyon had found no sign of building activity and had concluded that it ‘Seems thus far to be all rubbish’ (LD II, 41). It, as one might suspect,
this new work order came from Schumacher (prior to his departure from Samaria; he did not return until late in the day on the 28th), one can imagine the frustration felt by Lyon, who clearly realized that they had more workers than they could reasonably manage and that they had already opened more areas of excavation than they could possibly bring to a satisfactory conclusion by season’s end (even with the extraordinary number of labourers). In short, the field strategy, management relations, and project overall—just weeks into the inaugural season—lay in an untenable and unsustainable circumstance.

Biting Off Too Much at Another Luncheon, and Another Spat. By Wednesday, July 29, 1908, Lyon wrote: ‘At luncheon Dr. Schumacher, of his own accord, expressed the idea that it would be well to concentrate more on the summit . . . , and said he would order the squad working in [Trench] E. to begin in F., and would transfer part of those working in A. and D. to the summit’ (LD II, 54; italics added). It is hard to know the tone of the italicized portion of this passage. Was Lyon grateful for the fact that Schumacher had apparently come around to seeing the necessity of such a strategy? Or was he resentful of the fact that just five days prior to this time he (Lyon) himself had made the same basic proposal, only to meet opposition from Schumacher, who then left for his Haifa home, and now reintroduced the strategic adjustments as his own suggestion?

Whatever the feelings over lunch on the 29th, tensions mounted during yet another meal late in the season, on Friday, August 7, 1908.

I repeated at breakfast table my fears to Dr. Schumacher . . . that more surface is being covered than can be finished to [bed]rock before we close, in about two weeks. He accordingly afterwards limited the contracted limits of F on the north side and selected two or three parts of the trench to carry down to rock. He said that the widening deepening of the large tract west of H. had been discontinued. (LD II, 72; Lyon’s strikethroughs)

While it may appear, then, that Schumacher and Lyon finally stood in agreement with regard to curtailing the expansive scope of fieldwork, that was not the case. Schumacher ploughed ahead and almost immediately opened a new trench 3m in width.

Trench K. A new trench, 3.00 wide begun along southern side of the summit, from trench H westward. The eastern end is included included in the space already dug down several feet in the widening of trench H. To my inquiry Schumacher said this trench was to see if the temple [i.e., the Augusteum] wall extended so far. I repeated an old suggestion that a narrow trench be run from the platform south. (LD II, 72–73; Lyon’s underscoring and strikethrough)

In addition, workers now began clearing out the large vaulted chamber situated to the west of the Augusteum’s grand stairway (Figure 18). They had realized that the northern wall of the vault had a doorway, with three steps leading down into the chamber. So Schumacher began the clearing. Somewhat paradoxically, Lyon wrote, ‘I again urged on Dr. Sch. the importance of putting more workers on this chamber, pointing out that we can hardly hope to clear it in the remaining two weeks’ (LD II, 73).

Another irony emerged in the fact that now, so late in the inaugural season (Saturday, August 8, 1908) and in Trench F (Figure 19), where Lyon had finally persuaded Schumacher to limit the area of work, the most sought-after levels began to emerge. ‘Trench F. Only wheelbarrow men working at west end. Dr. Schumacher believes that we are now in Jewish or rather ‘Israelit’ish débris at the western end. He sent sixteen baskets of the pottery to Mr. Fisher, who spent all day studying and copying it, completing seven baskets’ (LD II, 88; Lyon’s underscoring). Fisher’s personal records confirm the sudden press of the ceramic load: ‘Put in whole time on sorting and recording the fragments of pottery from excavations on the summit. The results of this are given in another book’ (FD I, 122; August 9–10, 1908).

Virtually every excavator has experienced the rush of revealing an important discovery near the end of a scheduled season, even sometimes on the very last day of work. Such was the unfortunate case at Samaria, when deposits from Old Testament Israel—bearing material that would excite any donor of the time—finally appeared within their grasp. But pressures of time and finances had prompted both a restricting of areas worked and the ripping out of material culture by basketfuls—with both realities promoting shoddy recordkeeping.

‘You Can’t Fire Me . . . I Quit!’ That evening (August 8), with the excavation set to close in only two weeks, Lyon outlined nine ‘obvious things to be completed’ and added that the achievement of these goals would require
a stoppage of work at the village and a concentration of efforts on summit features (LD II, 81–82). But over lunch on Sunday, August 9, tempers once again flared and everything boiled over in what appears from Lyon’s diary to have been a heated exchange, which bears full citation.

At lunch I tried to discuss with Dr. Schumacher the 10 points . . . . He was reasonable for a while, but then lost his temper, and declared that it was clear that it had been decided to get rid of him, and that he would resign after this year anyhow, that I had written to him in Feb. that I was coming out not in the capacity of advisor: He went to the tent to get my letter, and there read that I was coming to aid ‘with advice’ and otherwise.

I assured him that I recognized him as the leader of the expedition and that decisions as to places of work must be made by him, my wish being only to make clear my judgment as to what ought to be done. I admit the value of all the work that has been done, but told him that I think that he has tried to do too much (to cover too much ground in the limited time). He said this was a new illustration of the old story that Germans and Americans cannot work together. [Recall the nervous general atmosphere in the region and in the world now as large scale war approached.]

I told him that if I were in his position, and in the head of an expedition, I should frequently and freely discuss with my associates plans and details and possibilities. He thought he had done this. I replied that there had not been a case wherein a discussion of plans had been introduced by him, and that I had to learn the meaning of new trenches by inquiring after they were started. That he had at times made a chance remark about the desirability of laying out a new trench, but not with any evident intention of discussion. I assured him that having put him in charge I was not going to interfere, but should limit my activity to an expression of my opinions, but I claimed that as representing the University it seemed to me reasonable to be kept well informed of every plan and every important step.

Dr. Schumacher seems to be in the unhappy mood of suspecting that I am in some way hostile, a state of mind entirely without foundation. (LD II, 83–85; Lyon’s strikethroughs; emphasis added)

Both men stewed over the exchange as the day progressed, and at tea time Lyon handed Schumacher a written letter (apparently to create an official paper trail but also perhaps from a feeling that they were now beyond reasonable verbal communication):

At tea in the afternoon I handed Dr. Schumacher the 10 points copied out, and introduced by the words:

‘Suggestions regarding the remainder of the present campaign, made in view of the apparent impossibility of completing now all the work that is in progress,’ and enclosing thus:

‘These suggestions are made for Dr. Schumacher’s consideration, with full recognition of the fact that any day’s discovery might make a serious modification necessary. David G. Lyon’ (LD II, 85)

Schumacher’s response, now once again affable in nature, proves of interest on both psychological and historical grounds. According to Lyon, he appealed to family pressures as a reason for having to rein in his position with the expedition. His reply also once again raises the spectre of World War I and the ever deteriorating relations between Germany and America. (As noted earlier, the Ottoman Empire eventually aligned with the Central Powers headed by Germany and Austria-Hungary, while America became one of the principal Allied Powers.)

He [Schumacher] assented to every point and said that he would proceed on that line.

He also stated that he could not so operate in the work next year because he needed to be more with his family, that the work here endangered his relations and that of the German Colony at Haifa with the officials, and he admitted that he would suffer no loss or wrong if his relations with the work close with this campaign and the completion of his report.

Mr. C.S. Fisher was present at both discussions. When I read this account to Fisher at 7 P.M. he stated that it was accurate and attaches hereto his signature. 9 Aug. 08.  Clarence Fisher. (LD II, 86; emphasis added)

Lyon then ended this diary entry with an addendum in which he reiterated his opposition to having so many workers on site (averaging more than 400, he said) and by repeating that ‘the work proceeds now too fast for adequate supervision and record’ (LD II, 87). Reliably, Lyon’s recorded points of view made Schumacher appear quite moody, changeable, and unpredictable. While one cannot gainsay Fisher’s presence at both discussions, it seems peculiar that no account of these exchanges, accounts that might verify or refute Lyon’s version, exist in his (or in Schumacher’s) private journals.

These lengthy passages are crucial to understanding the state of affairs between the excavation’s leaders as they neared the conclusion of the inaugural season. The two figures could not seem to reach a full and amicable understanding. On Monday, August 10, 1908, Lyon wrote,

The agreement of yesterday was observed in the work of today in the main. Exceptions were continuance by the e. and w. trench running west from southern part of H, i.e. K. . . . A new narrow trench was also begun west of tent[?] cutting across the western part of the platform
n. and s. This I had not contemplated. (Aug. 11. Asking Dr. S. at breakfast about this trench, he said he attached no importance to it, but thought he was acting on my wish. See my instruction no. 6 on p. 82. The new trench seems to be a misunderstanding of my suggestion.) (LD II, 87; emphasis added)

The sixth of Lyon’s ten instructions, which he had recorded on page 85 as a mere suggestion but which he cited as an instruction in this excerpt, read as follows: ‘explore platform enclosures on west where stones are gone.’ I have emphasized some of the more salient points in the above passage: (1) Schumacher pursued only a partial implementation of Lyon’s list; (2) he also initiated at least two exceptions to Lyon’s wishes; (3) Lyon had never considered an expansion of existing work areas or the opening of new areas this late in the season; (4) but, at this late hour, Schumacher began unfinishable work that he himself subsequently described as unimportant; and (5) Schumacher’s claim to be acting according to Lyon’s wish belied either pretense or impudence on his part. While Lyon concluded by allowing that at least some of the new work represented a simple ‘misunderstanding’ of what he had written and said to Schumacher, item No. 6 clearly states that the final exploration of that area was to occur where the stones had already been removed. That is to say, his intent seems to have wanted to avoid any new excavating there.

This passage is indeed very strange, especially with regard to Schumacher’s claim (pretence?) that he was simply following Lyon’s wish. If Lyon’s private accounts of their previous conversations are accurate, how could anyone believe that Lyon desired to open new areas or hire additional workers? One might interpret the current dilemma as comprising either an honest misunderstanding or a case of orchestrated manipulation—perhaps by both parties. Maybe the adventure-story title should read: ‘A Passive-aggressive Engineer and the Overly Prickly Lyon.’ In any event, Lyon’s second diary concludes with the following August 11th entry: ‘Schumacher has been unusually agreeable all day. – Commissaire returns from Nablus. – Our table boy Awad bitten in heel by a dog today’ (LD II, 95).

Alas, such trouble seems to have followed poor Awad, for on Monday, August 17, Lyon recorded, ‘Awad bitten by a scorpion last night’ (LD III, 16).

III. Making the Most of Trying Times? Or Making the Most Trying of Times?

Records, Revolution, and Another Deep Hole. Sunday, August 16, 1908. ‘Began with Fisher making a copy of the Register, which has been kept by Dr. Schumacher of the objects found’ (LD III, 14). One wonders whether this activity, completed during the weekend absence of Schumacher, represented simply a normal ‘back-up’ procedure or something deeper—a distrust of Schumacher and the suspicion that he may resist turning over such records at the end of the season. Judging from Lyon’s diaries, the latter option seems likely. Shortly after this time, he wrote of Schumacher’s obstinacy with regard both to field strategy (LD III, 22–23) and the keeping/sharing of records (LD III, 26–27). These passages reveal just how serious the rift in leadership had become.

In addition to excavation challenges and problems of personality at Samaria, the directors always had to keep a wary eye out for unrest and disputes in Nablus at both the personal and municipality levels. A diary entry for Sunday, August 16, 1908, reads: ‘Revolution. It is reported that affairs are growing turbulent in Nablus. The power of the governor is not respected, the two chief families, Abd al-Hadi and Hammad, are quarrelling, and there is a tendency to lawlessness’ (LD III, 14; Lyon’s underscoring). These kinds of local disputes posed a constant threat of spilling over into the affairs of the excavation.

But, to the end, the principal rupture lay in the Lyon-Schumacher relationship. On the day before the close of fieldwork for the 1908 Season (Thursday, August 20), yet another confrontation occurred over one of their longstanding issues—initiating too much work for the time left.

In the late afternoon, just before dinner, I asked Dr. Schumacher a question about a large opening found today in the s.e. corner of vaulted chamber.

He replied that he could answer my question after the hole is cleaned out, that he was too tired to talk, that he could hardly stand, was almost sick, had too much to do, and was not sure that he could hold out till the end of next week.

As I had done several times previously, I asked why he did not make use of Mr. Fisher’s assistance in the work of measuring and drawing. He replied, he wished to do the work himself.

It is quite evident that he cannot complete what remains to be done by the closing of the campaign on Friday next, and that his behavior is unfair to himself, disloyal to his employees and not in the interests of science. I have repeatedly explained to him that I must have plans to show Mr. Schiff on my return. I see no chance that plans can be ready unless Fisher and I make them. The situation is anomalous and most disagreeable. (LD III, 22–23)

This passage makes clear that Lyon saw Schumacher’s decisions and demeanour as disrespectful to those both below and above him in the expedition’s hierarchy. On a practical level, Lyon understood that Schumacher’s decline not only made it nearly impossible just to finish the inaugural season but also jeopardized the longevity of the project overall. The reference to Schiff again reminds the reader that Lyon had to balance many more behind-the-scenes administrative concerns than did Schumacher, who by this point (in Lyon’s diaries, at least) looks extremely weary, somewhat incompetent, and actually unstable to a degree.
More Scrambled Relations for Breakfast. The closing days of any field season always prove extremely tense as pressure mounts to conclude the work, preserve the site, process the finds and photography, write the reports, etc. A strained working relationship between project leaders only exacerbates the anxiety and prepares the stage for elevated discord or even open hostility. Thus it was at Samaria. Over the course of three days (August 22–25), the already fragile relationship between Lyon and Schumacher erupted into heated exchanges.

Sebastie, Sat., Aug. 22, 1908. At breakfast (Fisher also present) I asked Dr. Schumacher if he did not think it might be well for me to take a copy of his scientific diary, giving two reasons 1) danger of loss if only one copy existed. 2) information of the Committee [at Harvard], so that they might have the material for advising Dr. S. as to the fullness of report to be submitted by him. He replied that until his report is ready no one could have a copy of his diary, it being his intellectual property. I may That when his report is ready he would turn over the diary to Harvard, but until then it could not pass out of his hands. He replied that until his report is ready no one could have a copy of his diary, it being his intellectual property. I must have it by him day and night till work is over here, perhaps next Thursday night. Then I could see it. I proposed some noon hour when he is taking his siesta. He replied, he would not give it out of his hands at all, and that no note might be made as to its contents. He thought he may have made a mistake in allowing a copy to be made of the register of objects found, because that register contains records of discoveries made by him, credit for which he is entitled to.

As he was leaving the work for good, he said, he did not consider it proper to give copies of the material out of his hand until he is through working it up. I replied that if he thought any improper use would be made of the material by Harvard University, he did not really realize quite the quality of those with whom he is dealing. (LD III, 26–27; Lyon’s strikethroughs; emphasis added)

The following day, Lyon again complained privately of his lack of access to the recorded results of their work:

Sunday, Aug. 23, 1908. Schumacher having refused to allow the copy of his ‘scientific diary’ to be made, and having not allowed Fisher to have any hand in the measurements and drawings and sketch making on the hill, I, in order not to go home without certain material for certain places and elevations, worked with Fisher three or four hours taking measurements, espec. of

Figure 20: Plan of Samaria ‘Surveyed by G. Schumacher, April, May 1908’ (courtesy of the Semitic Museum, Harvard University).
the ‘Israelite’ wall, vaulted chamber and altar.
(LD III, 28)

It is interesting that, at least according to Lyon, Schumacher claimed the excavation’s records, drawings, etc., as his own ‘intellectual property,’ not that of Harvard, his employer (Figures 20 & 21). If Lyon’s allegation is true, the concept relates to an ownership issue that persists even to this day, whether involving field notes or lecture content delivered in a classroom setting. Schumacher’s stance appears to stand in contrast to that of Fisher, who from the beginning placed the notice, ‘Property of Samaria Exped. Harvard University,’ inside the title page of each volume of his diaries.

Schumacher apparently preferred to hold everything, equipment as well as records, close at hand. His diary entry from Thursday, June 4, is informative: ‘I lent my level instrument to the Expedition or Mr. Fisher, with the understanding that should it be lost or damaged that the University of Harvard would pay me £10. In case the instrument is damaged the damage must be made good by the University. Arrived at this understanding with Prof. Lyon’ (SD I, 46; italics added). Taking such pains to turn the use of a standard piece of equipment into a contractual agreement seems curious. It may belie a basic attitude of either personal mistrust in what amounted to a German-American relationship or other, ever-growing historical realities (recall the coming of WW II).

In any event, it seems noteworthy that Fisher’s diary Vol. I concludes with, and that the entirety of Vol. II is dedicated to, a long series of drawings that bear numerous measurements. In addition, Vol. II included four and a half pages of recorded levels. This material likely reflects the work that he hastily completed with Lyon in the final days of the 1908 Season. More importantly, however, Lyon and Schumacher once again seem to have reached an impasse.

... Wrote a letter to Schumacher asking him to state in writing his objections to my having a copy of the scientific material. Copy. [Not delivered. Aug. 28]

... Schumacher, commissaire and foremen packed the antiques for shipment to Constantinople, 3 boxes. (LD III, 28; Lyon’s underscoring)

Taken together, these notations indicate that Lyon could not even participate in the packing of the artifacts—an incredible circumstance, given his position within both the Semitic Museum and the Samaria Expedition. Once again, one wonders whether the presentation of a letter stemmed from a desire by Lyon to create an official record, a paper trail, or from the mere fact of a total inability for the two to communicate profitably through oral communications. But beyond this question, these records read as though Schumacher was colluding with the crooked commissaire to exclude Lyon from as many elements of the excavation as possible. (Later that night, when Lyon paid the commissaire, ‘he was much dissatisfied and insisted that his services had been so valuable as to deserve much larger pay. I assured him I would gladly pay him two fold if we were in a position to do so’ [LD III, 29].)
On the grand level, Lyon clearly resented the fact that, after the expenditure of much time, money, and effort, he possessed basically nothing to take home to present to the Committee of the Semitic Museum, the President of Harvard University, or the generous patron, Jacob Schiff. Personally, he found himself in a most compromised circumstance; and beyond that, the entire project seemed doomed.

How Many Sides Are There to Every Argument? The window into the project’s status presented above once again and by necessity depends almost exclusively on Lyon’s personal, unpublished account of the situation. As noted earlier, Fisher makes no mention in his diaries of any of these exchanges. His entry for August 20 or 21 reads simply: ‘made a series of levels at A as follows,’ followed by ‘sorted pottery and made late in the afternoon some additional measurements in A’ (FD I, 132). His silence regarding both the dispute and the new ‘hole’ seems quite peculiar, almost strange.

Moreover, Schumacher himself made no mention of any of these episodes in his journals. Beginning on August 20, he attentively recorded, as he usually did: ‘Temp. at 5.0 AM. 22° Cels. Calm. The Dominican Fathers [Pere Vincent Confrères, who had arrived the previous day] left camp at 6:30 AM. . . . Found today the upper part of the statue the forehead of marble’ (FD I, 141–2; Schumacher’s underscoring, Figure 21). Thus go the remainder of his fieldwork and the discovery of various interesting objects (August 21), points at which the bedrock on the summit shows signs of artificial shaping (August 22), paying the commissaire in the presence of Lyon (August 23), giving Fisher a plan of the summit to prepare for tracing (August 25), etc. The closest Schumacher ever came during these trying days to detailing a controversy dealt with the interpreter, Frauq Datodi, Said, for his own shady use or personal gain. Schumacher offered a lightly stated objection to this act (‘I told him that I did not consider this handling of antiquities quite correct . . . ’). Subsequently, on August 26, the commissaire returned with a copy, written in Turkish, of the list of objects found during the season. Schumacher had to sign it. But, knowing that the commissaire had removed certain objects, he added, ‘I shall send Hamdi Bey a copy of our Registrar in English’ (SD II, 151)—another mild response that communicated Schumacher’s distrust of the commissaire’s motives. These notations are about as volatile as any in Schumacher’s private records.

In this regard, the tone and content of the close of Schumacher’s journal seem relevant.

Friday 28th August 1908 . . . . Prof. Lyon and Mr. Fisher left our town house at 3 PM. and drove to Nablus and Jerusalem. Frauq Datodi accompanied them. Squared all accounts between 4 and 6 PM. with foremen, cook, soldier, Moh. Sais and those workmen that were engaged in transferring our camp to Dér Sharaf. Finally we prepared an accurate inventory of all things including plant belonging to the University and then packed our private effects. At 10 PM. in the night we had finished everything ready for the start to-morrow morning.

Thus closed this year’s archaeological Excavations at Sebastiyeh. (SD II, 158–59; Schumacher’s underscoring)

Curiously—particularly in the light of Lyon’s records—these entries nowhere display conflict with or animosity toward Lyon or anyone else. Instead, they appear to contain only an interest in the accurate accounting of objects, etc. They also record that Fisher did, in fact, receive a presumably final plan for official tracing. In short, these private records carry a very different tenor from the interpretation Lyon places on the situation. One should recall as well that Fisher nowhere wrote of open conflict between Lyon and Schumacher. So how many sides are there to every argument? In this case, judging from the written records available today, only one.

And Mohammed Said said . . . . On August 24, 1908, the day after the latest breakfast row and letter exchange between Lyon and Schumacher, a great rumpus erupted between Lyon and Mohammed Said, the new commissaire who had recently replaced the intractable Hasan Bey. The dispute began over both an ever-pressing anxiety for Lyon—money—and the disposition of artifacts but ended with an ominous threat from Said. Through the dragoman interpreter, Frauq Datodi, Said, . . . . held a long harangue on his services to us, preventing the government at Nablus from stopping our work, etc., etc. Similar language he used to Schumacher last evening. We told him last evening that our money was very short, that I receive nothing for my services and that Mr. Fisher gets little more than his traveling expenses, but nothing seemed to impress him.

He has undoubtedly been of great assistance to us, but we think that he has done us no more than his duty and that he has been well paid.

In taking leave of Schumacher he remarked that next year he would show us the rigors of the law. Evidently if there is to be a campaign next year, he is not the proper man for our commissaire. (LD III, 31; emphasis added)

This interchange at the close of the work draws together several key administrative afflictions that ran throughout the summer of 1908. It also reiterates Lyon’s scepticism that a return to the field for the second of five projected seasons would prove possible in the near future.
Breaking Camp, Taking Measurements, Making and Keeping Commitments. On Friday, August 25, 1908, Lyon wrote,

Finished copying register of antiques found, except some of the sketches. This book has been kept by Sch., who several times refused proffered assistance. . . .

Schumacher agreed to prepare a copy of his scientific journal and send it to us promptly, excepting such passages as contain his original suggestions, ideas and combinations. He feels that such passages ought not to pass out of his hand until before his report is prepared, which he thinks may be ready by the New Year. (LD III, 33; emphasis added)

So here, near the end, one sees more signs of unremitting struggle, now over the status of excavation records as ‘intellectual property’ as well as a concern over the stages at which Schumacher would share this property with Lyon. With an economy of words, Lyon seems to contrast ‘promptly’ with the more distant ‘New Year’ and his desired full and unfettered access to field records with Schumacher’s promise, even now, to release only the material that he himself did not originate. In short, Lyon continues to present his partner as greedy with scientific data and paranoid concerning his own employers and sponsor.

And, again, we see Lyon’s view that the earlier mismanagement of time and resources by Schumacher has now become a causal factor inducing much of the stress at the end of the field work. ‘We are all expending the time now in doing the last things. Sch. taking measurements on the hill. Had he used Fisher for this work, as I advised so often, there would not now be such a rush’ (LD III, 33). In his view, Schumacher’s resistance and contrariness had actually cost the project both time and money. The final time crunch manifested itself in various practical ways: August 27— ‘Packed objects for leaving tomorrow. Photographing and printing not being done, Frauq Datodi is to go with us to Jerusalem to finish the work there’ (LD III, 36).

The expedition ‘broke camp’ on Friday, August 28, 1908. Lyon received from Schumacher the pay sheets up through August 21. Schumacher also agreed (1) to prepare a copy of the Register and to send it to Hamdi Bey in Istanbul, (2) to ‘copy the accounts and send me [Lyon] the original promptly,’ and (3) ‘to send soon a copy of the ‘scientific diary’, and of the level book.’ As they took their leave of one another, Lyon wrote ‘an agreement’ to this effect, which both he and Schumacher signed (LD III, 38; italics added).

So Lyon—the securer of finances, de facto organizer, and chief administrative officer in charge of the entire project on behalf of the Semitic Museum and Harvard University—apparently left the field with little or no real scientific data or even much in the way of elevations for the architecture and objects they had found. He had only whatever data he and Fisher had scrambled to collect in the closing days of the season. This situation, if accurate, seems quite incredible, given that there could have been no project without Lyon. In any event, Lyon left Samaria at 2:30pm on August 28 and headed via Nablus to Jerusalem with Fisher and Frauq Datodi, and from Jerusalem to Port Said (Egypt), Naples, and then homeward on September 7.

Still, despite all that had transpired between Lyon and Schumacher, both men appear to have honoured their pledges to one another. Lyon kept, at least in time, his financial commitment to Schumacher:

Jerusalem, Sept. 4, 1908. . . . Wrote Harvard Bursar to send Dr. G. Schumacher 30 pounds sterling to pay his salary for August.

[Cambridge, Massachusetts] March 5, 1909. . . . Asked Bursar to pay Dr. G. Schumacher's balance of francs 159.20 (final payment). (LD III, 41, 56; Lyon’s underscoring)

And after returning to Cambridge, Massachusetts, Lyon recorded on October 5, 1908, that he did, in fact, receive from Schumacher ‘a copy of his official journal and of the Level Book (Samaria documents)’ (LD III, 45; italics added). Later, on January 6, 1909, he wrote: ‘Rec’d from G. Schumacher the originals of his official Samaria journal (2 vols), Level Book, Register of objects found, and his report on the campaign at Samaria’ (LD III, 51). Finally, by February 2, 1909, Lyon received a box of additional materials (mostly plans and sections) from Schumacher, a shipment that had been delayed in the Boston Customs House (LD III, 52–53). Thus it appears that Schumacher also gradually made good on his promises.

Heading Home and Recommending by Denial. While in Port Said on his homeward journey, Lyon documented the following communiqué on September 8, 1908: ‘Telegram from G. A. Reisner at Cairo, saying that he has a cable from Pres. Eliot to the effect that Reisner is to have charge at Samaria next year’ (LD III, 44). This cable had to come as good news to Lyon: the highest official at Harvard University not only approved the proposed transition to Reisner as field director but also clearly expected to launch a second season at Samaria. Still, a nagging awareness must surely have lingered that the unplanned change in on-site leadership arose from an extremely trying and shaky inaugural season.

Lyon's journal contains one more strange entry relating to Schumacher, recorded in Cambridge on October 30, 1908: ‘Letter from Schumacher saying there is a report that he stole objects from Samaria last summer and asking me to write to Constantinople in denial. A similar report was rec'd from F. Datodi on Oct. 26' (LD III, 47).

One wonders whether these accusations were fabricated and somehow linked to the illegal removal of coins and
Buried History 2016 - Volume 52, 3-30  Ron E. Tappy

other artifacts by the malcontent commissaire Mohammed Said. In any event, as a follow-up to Schumacher’s request, Lyon wrote on November 11 to G.W. Fowle, at the American Embassy in Constantinople, ‘telling him to lay the letter before Hamdi Bey, if he hears that any hostile report has been sent to Hamdi about our work last summer’ (LD III, 47; italics added). Interestingly, this reply did not immediately address the indictment against Schumacher; nor did it even mention his name. Instead, Lyon directed that his generic defense of the integrity of the project overall become active only if a more official complaint were raised and sent to Hamdi Bey.

Importantly, not until April 13, 1909, did Lyon send a copy of a letter to Schumacher ‘regarding accounts, report of last year’s work, etc. Sent him also a denial (copy) of the report that he had been dismissed by Harvard from his position’ (LD III, 63). No other related entries appear in Lyon’s diaries. Moreover, his subsequent reports on the work of the first season to various committees at Harvard lack any further reference to Schumacher, the perceived costly disruptions that he had caused during the season, or the post-season allegations of misappropriation against him.

IV. Concluding Comments: A Personal Reflection on the Hermeneutical Predicament

Before closing this story, I return to the interpretative challenge that I acknowledged from the outset and mentioned in my opening comments on sources. Biographical research such as I have presented here carries with it a certain, peculiar risk, perhaps particularly because it deals with unpublished, private diaries of our long-deceased academic forbearers. These learned, dedicated individuals represent the actors who gave shape to the story I now attempt to tell, indeed, who created it by living it, and who often sought refuge in their private journals. Such writings may take the modern reader closer to an author’s own heart than does the published, academic report that ultimately emerged from the work. But to what extent do these previously unshared, handwritten accounts contain reliable assessments of the day-to-day situations in which the actors found themselves?

At Samaria, this question is exacerbated by the general impression one acquires when reading the journals of Lyon versus those of Schumacher and Fisher. The writings of the latter two men generally seem factual and work-related; those of Lyon, while containing such information, also include much more personal interpretation of events. Whereas Schumacher or Fisher might write something on the order of ‘We went there and did such and such,’ Lyon would say of the same activity that ‘We went there and did such and such, during which time Schumacher made a poor judgment and then would not listen to reason.’ Schumacher and Fisher rarely, if ever, moved to the second-stage annotation in their notes. Lyon, on the other hand, frequently commented on situations as he saw them. So the question arises: Did he see them correctly?

Unquestionably, Lyon represented the undisputed force behind not only the founding and early survival of the Semitic Museum at Harvard University but also the entire expedition to Samaria. Without him and his personal friendship with Jacob Schiff, it seems unlikely that either entity could have emerged, much less thrived. Lyon invested more symbolic capital (energy, planning, fundraising, administrating, executing, etc.) in the excavations at Samaria than any other person. He, therefore, had more to lose than anyone else—abundantly more than Schumacher. For Lyon, this field project represented one element of a superior aspiration, a larger dream. The leaves of his private journals slowly but surely reveal this fact.

In my judgment, one cannot deny another fact: Schumacher did not succeed at Samaria. History does not need the journals of Lyon to tell that much. Yet, after many readings of the entire corpus of private writings left by Lyon, Schumacher, and Fisher, and after developing some knowledge of the state of ‘best practices’ in the emerging discipline of field archaeology in 1908, I have concluded that Schumacher’s lack of success at Samaria stemmed more from personality differences and personal clashes with Lyon than from an insurmountable lack of skills, whether administrative or archaeological. I have described, for example, Schumacher’s familial and emotional ties to the Templer community at Haifa, for which Lyon showed little appreciation, or even awareness. Trouble between the two men brewed over the seemingly minor and soluble question of when to restart the fieldwork following their trip to Constantinople. Once it did resume, Lyon seized mainly on over-expansive work areas and labour force as reasons to fulfill his already hatched scheme to edge Schumacher out of the project.

Perhaps Schumacher did overreach by opening too many tracts of excavation and employing too many workers, more than could be managed or paid for, even as the inaugural season drew to a close. But such realities should not obscure his otherwise valuable qualities and abilities, e.g., his background in engineering. The skillset he brought to the project—topographical and excavation-related surveying, planning, drawing, communication in Arabic, etc.—surely did not lie within Lyon’s command. One can appreciate Schumacher’s prodigious surveying talents, for example, by reviewing the series of extraordinarily detailed maps he created not only of regions in Palestine, with thorough descriptions of archaeological remains, but also the entire eastern Mediterranean world. (These impressive drawings remain available in high resolution through the German Society for the Excavation of Palestine; http://www.palaestina-verein.de/wp/wordpress/?page_id=2010&lang=en) Schumacher’s field sketches of land allotments around Sebastie and architecture at Samaria prove just as impressive.

History may have shown that Schumacher’s replacement, George Andrew Reisner, had (or was developing) a vision for how to excavate stratigraphically, to engage in detailed debris-layer analysis, etc. But hardly anyone
else at that time (or for some time to come) had such foresight or ability, not even the trained archaeologists of the day. That Reisner privately critiqued various professional colleagues on that very score confirms this state of affairs. It may be asking too much, then, to expect Schumacher to have known to excavate in this manner. Current standards sought the exposure of architectural horizons, not stratified deposits of earth. Lyon himself, with a degree in Syriac, was undoubtedly also learning the stratigraphic method of digging and recording on the job. And concerning the size of Schumacher’s work force, one must acknowledge that the numbers did not diminish at all that significantly under Reisner’s subsequent leadership. In these and other matters, one might expect Schumacher’s prior experience at Megiddo to have led to greater refinement of his management skills and overall field techniques. But he always thought as an engineer, not an archaeologist.

In sum, it appears that Lyon and Schumacher were not well suited partners. Yet while Lyon may have shouldered heavier responsibility and harboured greater vision beyond the project itself, both he and Schumacher brought valuable skills to their work. It seems reasonable, therefore, to temper the subtle but steady, post-Constantinople criticism of Schumacher that Lyon delivers in his private records.

Postscript: Starting Over - then Over again

Changing without Changing. The Harvard Expedition to Samaria would go forward but only for a total of three field seasons, not the projected five years envisioned by the patron, Jacob Henry Schiff. Following the close of the inaugural season, Gottlieb Schumacher would not return to the project. George Andrew Reisner served as on-site field director during the 1909–1910 campaigns. During these years, Lyon spent less time at Samaria and more time coordinating affairs from Cambridge, Massachusetts. Conduct of the excavation appears to have improved under Reisner’s more involved participation, although at least one aspect—and one which Lyon had portrayed as a particularly worrying thorn in his flesh, namely, the inordinately large force of workers—did not seem to change over the remainder of the project. On May 24, 1909, Lyon received a letter from Reisner containing various comments about the financial accounts. In an earlier and related communiqué, composed at Joppa while en route to Samaria, Reisner had written of the need to deposit more money into the local account by June 1 ‘if we are to work 300 men’ (LD III, 68; italics added). Back in the day, as Lyon tried to work alongside Schumacher at Samaria, this program would surely have garnered a derisive comment in Lyon’s private journal. But now the museum curator nowhere opposed this plan. In fact, after a consultation with authorities at Harvard, he sent the money without question, reservation, or objection. The work of the 1909 Season began on June 1, after Lyon had received the following cable from Reisner: ‘Postponing departure [from Cairo] until May first. Official advice.’

Lyon surmised that the notice came ‘doubtless on account of the present disturbed state of affairs in the Turkish Empire’ (LD III, 65).

The Final Blow: A Patron on the Run. Thus began the Harvard campaigns at Samaria, the largest and best-funded project ever to have taken the field in Palestine. From the initial application for a license to excavate, however, many obstacles and forces militated against success, and the inaugural season particularly proved to be a time of incremental decline. By the end of August, 1908, a rather wobbly vision awaited redefinition, ironically under the new leadership of an Egyptologist. Many features of the project, both archaeological and administrative, did improve over the following two years, as the team went on to clarify or expose such valuable contributions as the Israelite palace, the Samaria Ostraca (which Reisner considered the most important find of all), the great Herodian Augusteum, and more. But, alas, the three-year period of work totally consumed the projected five-year budget and, apparently wary of what this fact portended for future financial needs and demands, none other than Jacob Henry Schiff himself forced an end to the project after only three years’ work (see LD III, 80–84). Following the 1910 Season, Reisner cabled Lyon from Cairo on January 13, 1911, informing him that he (Reisner) would set sail for America on January 26. Reisner then inquired whether he should apply for a new license to excavate at Samaria. Lyon’s return message said simply: ‘No. Later
we hope’ (LD III, 102). But ‘later’ never came; thereafter, Harvard could not go it alone.

Back to the Future: Harvard, Samaria, British Connections, and More Schiff Money. Official publication of Harvard’s three-year campaign finally appeared in 1924. The University’s connection to Samaria, however, would continue in the wake of defeated Central Powers and a collapsed Ottoman regime and without a German-trained engineer as on-site principal. (Other influential figures, such as Gustaf Dalman, the first Director of the German Protestant Institute of Archaeology [Deutsches Evangelisches Institut für Altertumswissenschaft des Heiligen Landes], also fell into disfavour as the new constellation of nation-states took shape.) By 1920, Reisner had applied to the recently ensconced British ‘Mandate Palestine’ for another permit to excavate at Samaria, this time as part of a proposed collaborative project. Ironically, Professor Kirsopp Lake (1872–1946; Figure 22), an Englishman serving as Winn Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Harvard but who wrote mainly in New Testament studies, played a key role in launching the so-called ‘Joint Expedition’ in 1931. The resumed work at Samaria, directed by John Winter Crowfoot, ran through 1935. In August 1932, Lake divorced Helen Courthope Forman, his wife of 29 years, and in December married Silva Tipple New (1898–1983; Figure 23), his former student who was 26 years younger than Lake, married, a mother of four, and who had taken a post as professor of classics at Bryn Mawr. (Consequently, Lake lost the Winn Professorship in September 1932 but remained as a professor of history in Harvard College until 1938.) Silva Lake became the epigraphist for the Joint Expedition and ultimately published the Greco-Roman inscriptions in the final report (Crowfoot et al. 1942, 1957).

Interestingly, in 1895 Frieda Schiff, daughter of Jacob Henry and Therese Loeb Schiff, married the German-born American financier Felix Moritz Warburg, who hailed from the famous Warburg banking family in Hamburg and who had risen to partner in his new father-in-law’s very successful investment firm. With the rekindled British-American interest in Samaria in the 1930s, Frieda Warburg continued the Schiff family’s support of work there by helping to sponsor the Joint Expedition.

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